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ABSTRACT 
 
 Cleavages, Social Engagement and Trust in Post-Communist Europe. (December 2008) 
David Otto Rossbach, B.A., University of Wisconsin – Whitewater 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Alexander C. Pacek 
 
 This dissertation addresses generalized trust in Post-Communist Europe.  I 
examine trust stressing two sets of factors: the impact of attitudes associated with 
cleavages coming out of transition to democracy, and the importance of informal 
interpersonal association over more formal, structured forms of association.  I argue that 
the classic list of cleavages suggested by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) have less importance 
to trust since those cleavages developed under the communist one-party state and were 
therefore less connected to the party system.  As a result, these classic cleavages did not 
have the same mobilization functions as they did in Western Europe.  Instead, I argue 
that cleavages that have developed out of the transition to democracy and a free-market 
economic system bear greater importance to trust. 
 I further argue that due to the experience of forced group association during the 
communist era, and lingering distaste for formal political participation, the familiar 
Western models of the benefits of social engagement underestimate the importance of 
informal association in the post-communist states.  Informal association was a key 
component of survival during the communist era and continues to be a valuable means 
of conferring information and forming political judgments.   
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 The first contribution this dissertation makes is that it brings together theories of 
political cleavages with theories of trust and social capital development.  The 
dissertation bridges the gap between societal divisions and the position of the individual 
within these divisions.  A second contribution of the dissertation is the testing of 
established theories of formal social engagement in post-communist states.  The 
secretive nature of association during the communist era differs greatly from the open 
nature of association in the West.  Theories of trust and social capital development must 
take this fact into account when exploring post-communist states. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: TRUST IN CENTRAL EASTERN EUROPE 
 The topics of trust and social capital are amongst the most examined subjects in 
contemporary political science research.  Trust, identified as a central concept wrapped 
up within the greater research focusing on social capital, has a long and established chain 
of literature in political science.  Trust is regarded by many as the glue that holds 
democratic nations together.  The work on trust may broadly be divided into two camps: 
those that treat trust endogenously as an existing, fixed value affecting behavior and 
those that treat trust exogenously as a malleable, changeable entity. Under the latter 
definition, then, trust is something that may be gained and lost.   
 This dissertation asks the following primary question:  who trusts?  What 
attitudes do they exhibit that are either supportive or detrimental to trust?  It has been 
argued that numerous political cleavages related to the transition to democracy 
developed in post-communist European states, begging the question how might these 
cleavages and the attitudes reflective of them affect trust within the citizenry?  Using 
cross-national survey data from four of the most successful states in Central Eastern 
Europe, this dissertation will examine those very questions. 
 The states of Central Eastern Europe are generally regarded as being highly 
distrustful.  They have good reason to be.  The grounds for this distrust may be found 
coming from two sources: their experiences with the great European empires ranging 
from the 18th to the 20th Centuries, and their experience under Communist rule during  
____________ 
This dissertation follows the style of the American Political Science Review. 
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the latter half of the 20th Century.  The countries that will be examined in greater detail 
in this dissertation are the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia.  While all of 
these states have experienced the greatest successes of the post-communist states, they 
also have numerous differences in their individual experiences with empirical rule and 
Communist domination. 
Colonies of empires 
European history from the 17th up until the early 20th Centuries is a history of 
imperial interactions.  The British, Prussians, Austrians, Russians and French all had 
vast empires spanning the globe, directing the relationships between them.  The states of 
Central and Eastern Europe, however, did not have such empires.  These countries had a 
much different experience with empire than their Western neighbors.  The states of 
Central Eastern Europe were among the colonies of the great Western empires; pawns in 
great struggle between these leviathans. As such, Central Eastern Europe was 
consistently let down by major Western powers.  Once they had achieved their 
independence from the Western European empires, they were forced into a subservient 
position via the new empire in the regions, the Soviet Union.  The words Yalta, Tehran, 
and Potsdam represent the ultimate betrayal on the part of the West towards Central 
Europe, and accordingly the states of Central Europe learned to distrust the West 
through first-hand experience.  The Revolutions of 1989 were home grown revolutions 
and it can be argued that they were successful because of the historical training provided 
by the states’ early positions within the Western empires. 
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 The Habsburg Empire controlled the Czech Republic, more properly the Czech 
lands of Bohemia and Moravia, throughout the 17th – early 20th Centuries.  The Czech 
nobility early on established itself as a center of nationalist sentiments and took the 
mantle of greater Slavic unity in the face of the Austrian to heart.  An unsuccessful 
rebellion of their own in 1848 served to establish a fighting spirit that would come in 
handy come the end of the Habsburg Empire as Czechoslovakia established the first 
parliamentary democracy of the Inter-war period. 
 Hungary, on the other hand, experienced both sides of the great imperial divide, 
as they were both subject and master at different points within the same empire.  For 
much of the history of the Habsburg Empire, the Hungarians were but one of the 
numerous ethnic constituencies.  That began to change in 1848, the year of great 
European revolutions, when the Hungarian nobility joined the peasantry to revolt against 
their Austrian rulers.  While that revolt, in and of itself, was unsuccessful it did begin a 
process of negotiation between the Austrians and Hungarians that led to a change in the 
status of the Hungarians (Glenny 1999).  Hungary was granted partner status within the 
Empire in 1874, renaming it the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and granting Hungary ruling 
status over a significant area of land incorporating much of present-day Northern Serbia, 
Slovenia, Slovakia, the Transylvania region of Romania to name a few.  Thus Hungary 
experienced the era of European empires from both dominant and subservient positions 
over this time period. 
Poland has unquestionably had the most traumatic experience with empire as it 
was partitioned by the three dominant empires of the day and ceased to exist as an 
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independent state for nearly 150 years.  The pivotal event in the early history of Poland 
was the so-called Third Partitioning in 1795.  Through a complicated series of political 
machinations between various sectors of the Polish nobility and the neighboring 
empires, the Prussian, Russian and Habsburg empires actually assumed control of, in 
totality, the whole of Polish lands.  With the exception of brief periods of semi-
independent zones of control, Poland ceased to exist as an independent country until the 
end of World War I and the collapse of two of the three partitioning powers.  Once 
established, however, the newly independent Polish 2nd Republic proved to be a major 
disappointment as once again the Poles found themselves on the short end of the designs 
of great European powers.  Germany and the Soviet Union both invaded Poland in 1939 
thus beginning World War II.  Poland once again found herself under foreign rule1. 
 Slovenia arguably bears the distinction of being the least studied country of the 
former Yugoslavia.  This is partly due to its size, just over 1.5 million residents, and 
party to its relatively peaceful transition from communism to free market democracy.  
Like the Czech Republic, the Habsburg Empire, specifically the Hungarians, controlled 
the area of present-day Slovenia as these lands had not existed in a independent form.  
But Slovenia also bears the distinction of being located at the crossroads of Habsburg 
and Ottoman Empires, giving the small mountainous country an important geographical 
relationship to the great European empires.  Slovenia was also at this time nervous about 
Italian designs on its territory, and this fear influenced a great deal of Slovenia’s foreign 
policy (Glenny 1999).  The desire for security from Italy and nationalist sentiments of 
                                                
1 For the definitive history of Poland from origins to 1980 see Davies (1982a) and (1982b). 
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the post-World War I period led the Slovenes to enthusiastically join the newly created 
Kingdom of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, later renamed Yugoslavia (Land of the South 
Slavs). 
What all four have in common, as it pertains to the experience with empire, is the 
position of subservience in relation to the West.  Its nationalistic movements were reliant 
upon the ideology of the French Revolution.  The states themselves were reliant upon 
Westerns powers for their physical security.  The economies were reliant upon the West 
for trade both as destinations and as checkpoints long the greater trade routs to Asia, the 
Middle East and the Black Sea.  
The communist experience 
The second broad reason for distrust within these four states addresses the nature 
of Communist rule in each country.  Communism, like all authoritarian governing 
systems, thrives best when exercised in an environment of great distrust.  The 
institutional mechanisms of distrust abound in communist countries, as in all totalitarian 
regimes, and consisted of a mixture of ideological indoctrination, cooptation through 
dependence on the Party for one’s livelihood, and brute coercion.  While there was great 
variation between the Soviet Union and the satellite states it controlled, the four 
countries used in this study represent arguably the most liberal of the Soviet satellite 
states, and the most problematic for the Soviets to control.   
 A Communist Party frequently headed by moderate liberals led the Czech 
Republic.  This liberalism came to a head in the infamous Prague Spring of 1968, 
another example of the Soviet Union handling internal dissent with tanks.  This merely 
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served to push dissent underground, but not dispel it.  The Czechs Diaspora spread 
throughout the West was well positioned to spread the word on the injustices of Soviet 
rule.  As the voices of the Diaspora tended to come from the artistic community, those 
voices tended to be particularly effective and dramatic and international support, at least 
on the surface, for the plight of the Czechs was high.  Following a series of protests in 
1989 close on the heels of the Solidarity electoral victory in Poland, the Czech 
democratic opposition was able to take advantage of the liberal tradition within the 
Communist Party to successfully negotiate the end of Party rule without major 
bloodshed.  The precedent set in Poland had begun to spread south. 
Hungary also represented a more liberal socialist tradition, and hosted one of the 
earliest open rebellions against the Soviets that dramatically affected Soviet policy for 
the next 30 years.  The 1956 Hungarian Uprising served as an excellent example of both 
how heavy a hand the Soviets were willing to wield in the face of an upstart liberal 
movement, as well as just how little support the East could expect from the West 
(Roskin 2002).  After 1956, Hungary quietly bided its time under Soviet rule but 
reassumed a pivotal role in 1989.  One of the great symbolic events of the year was the 
tearing down of the barbed wire border between Austria and Hungary.  The Hungarian 
Socialist Worker’s Party also provided an interesting example for fellow communist 
parties to follow.  The Hungarian Party opened up the political arena to open party 
competition before any of the others, and it is often said that Hungary had party politics 
before it actually had political parties.  Hungary, then, served as the prime example of a 
negotiated, managed transition from the top down, and not from the bottom up. 
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 However rebellious the regimes of Hungary and Czechoslovakia may have been, 
Poland was undoubtedly the most rebellious of all the satellite states.  Stalin famously 
quipped that attempting to implement communism in Poland was like attempting to a 
“saddle a cow” (Davies 1982b).  Poland’s history of contention with the Russians goes 
back several hundred years, and the Soviet period represented just another expression of 
that hatred. The Polish United Workers Party was another of those satellite parties that 
allowed for a level of public discourse and intellectual freedom that was not allowed in 
the Soviet Union proper.  This gave the anti-Communist intelligentsia the ability to 
articulate their case to the outside world; an outside world that largely wrung their 
collective hands and wished the Polish underground well.  The intelligentsia would join 
forces with an upstart trade union of dock works from the Lenin Shipyards in Gdansk to 
for the Solidarity movement.  Solidarity is largely credited with pushing the first domino 
in collapse of communism, something they are quite proud to point out.  As the 
billboards commemorating the 25th anniversary of Solidarity proclaimed in the summer 
of 2005: It began in Gdansk.   
 The small republic of Slovenia had a different experience with communism 
altogether.  As a part of Yugoslavia, a state not dominated by the Soviet brand of 
communism, Slovenia found itself in a unique position.  Slovenia was the most 
economically advanced of the Yugoslav republics, as its progressive republican-level 
leadership and advantageous geographic positioning with Western Europe opened up 
greater trade with the West than other republic enjoyed.  As a result, Slovenia, with 
Croatia, largely propped up the Yugoslav economy.  It was along these lines that the 
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Slovenes sought reform within the Yugoslav federation after the collapse of the other 
communist states of Europe, not along political lines or the more extreme elements of 
national independence the rest of the components of Yugoslavia were calling for 
(Rizman 2006).  Perhaps the most important factors in the development of Slovenia 
since 1991 was the short (two-week) war of independence Slovenia fought with the 
Yugoslav (Serbian) army, avoiding the massive bloodshed that characterized the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia, and the role played by the civic organization DEMOS in 
peacefully mobilizing the public during the prelude to independence from Yugoslavia.2 
 The present day picture of all four of these countries is a bright one.  All four 
states were admitted into the European Union in 2004 and NATO in 1999 and 2004.  All 
four have benefited greatly from EU structural aid and the broader foreign investment 
that membership has encouraged. We have already seen that these states are playing an 
important role in internal EU politics as well.  Poland and the Czech Republic played 
significantly in the debate surrounding the draft EU Constitution and Slovenia is just 
now concluding its term as President of the Council of Ministers, the first Slavic state to 
assume that position. 
Dissertation outline 
The dissertation will proceed along the following outline.  Chapter II will serve 
two purposes.  The first is to elaborate on the key concepts this study follows; that of 
trust, social capital, socio-political cleavages, and the benefits of social engagement.  I 
will discuss on the definition of trust and the roles that both trust and distrust are thought 
                                                
2 For more information on DEMOS various aspects of the transition in Slovenia, see Ramet and Fink-
Hafner 2005). 
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to have on democratic politics.  I will also briefly review the concept of social capital as 
to give some clarity as to the contemporary analysis of trust and one of the central 
concepts of social capital.   
The second purpose of Chapter II will be to present the central theory of this 
dissertation: that attitudes relating to socio-political cleavages that have developed out of 
the transition away from communism affect an individual’s general trust and that the 
informal nature of post-communist social engagement likewise bears an important 
impact on generalized trust.  The first set of cleavage attitudes can be associated with 
broadly defined authoritarian vs. libertarian views of the role of government and of 
personal freedoms.  The second set of attitudes may be divided along a socially 
fundamentalist vs. social liberal cleavage.  Finally, attitudes expressing either 
satisfaction or frustration with the state of reforms undertaken since the fall of 
communism will be examined.  I will argue that broadly authoritarian, socially 
fundamentalist, and non-reformist attitudes exhibit a negative effect on a person’s 
general trust. 
The next three empirical chapters will test hypotheses relating trust to cleavages 
associated with the transition from communism to democracy.  Chapter III will examine 
the effect of cleavage attitudes associated with the transition from communism on 
generalized trust.  Chapter IV will examine the effects of various forms of social 
engagement on generalized trust, as well as attitudes associated with engagement. The 
last empirical chapter will present the results of joining the two models to give a more 
complete view of the interaction between attitudes and modes of engagement. Each 
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chapters will focus the analysis on the four countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
identified earlier.  
Finally, Chapter VI will summarize the key findings of the dissertation and 
suggest their implications for the integration of these states into the European Union, the 
implications for other states both in the region and in the former Soviet Union.  As is 
customary, I will also recommend future lines of inquiry that are suggested by these 
findings. 
Conclusion 
 The period since 1989 has been a turbulent time for the residents of Central 
Eastern Europe.  This dissertation aims to help provide an explanation as to how the 
divisions in opinion that have developed out of the democratic transition have affected 
people’s trust in each other.  I hope to further the notion that to best understand the 
political attitudes of post-communist democrats, and the choices those individuals make, 
it is best to examine the individual’s position within the newly created society. 
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CHAPTER II 
CLEAVAGES, SOCIAL ENGAGEMENT AND TRUST 
In this chapter I will review the concepts of trust, political cleavages and social 
engagement and how they apply in post-communist states.  I will also introduce the two 
central arguments made in this dissertation: that trust is affected by attitudes reflected in 
political cleavages born out of the transition to democracy and by the informal nature of 
social interaction in post-communist states.  These two arguments will be empirically 
tested in Chapters III and IV.  We will see that all three of these concepts are altered 
some in the face of post-communist social conditions. 
Trust  - definitions and importance 
 Why do we, and should we, care so much about the study of trust?  The 
motivation behind the intense interest in trust comes from a belief that trust is vital to a 
healthy civil society that dates as far back as Alexis de Tocqueville and his observations 
on American civic life in the 18th century (1990).  More recently than de Tocqueville, 
Brehm and Rahn (1997) have shown interpersonal trust and civic engagement to be 
bound in a tight reciprocal relationship, the later more strongly influencing the former.  
This belief is also affected by the gradual decline in levels of trust, and subsequently in 
social capital (Putnam 2000), around the world observed in the post-war era.  Trust and 
distrust have been linked to a number of political phenomena and have proven to be 
significant factors that affect both voting and non-voting forms of political behavior.  As 
such, this makes the study of trust an important aspect of political science as it speaks 
directly to the operation of democracy.  
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There are many definitions of trust, and while definitions of trust tend to vary 
from study to study Levi and Stoker (2000) note some items of consensus among these 
varying definitions.  First, trust is a relational concept that requires an individual 
exposing him or herself to potential harm or betrayal from other individuals or groups.  
Secondly, trust is given to specific individuals or institutions in specific arenas and is 
rarely unconditional.  Trust is a concept that can be categorized both dichotomously and 
on a scale, the former leaving the possibility of either trust or distrust of an individual or 
institution.   Judgments on trust are generally expected to motivate courses of action or 
affect behavior in somehow, and having trust is considered to be a good thing. Uslaner 
(2001; 2002) even goes so far as to refer to trust as the “chicken soup of social life”; 
which is to say that trust has healing powers for a society.  And finally, judgments of 
trust in some way reflect the presence or absence of trustworthiness in an individual or 
institution. 
Sztompka (1996; 2000) views trust as “a bet on the contingent future actions of 
others.”  Trust is crucial to a peaceful democratic society and we trust all the time in our 
democracy.  We trust that candidates believe something resembling what they say they 
believe, we trust that the vote we cast will be counted, we trust that the accumulation of 
votes will lead to the right candidate winning (however the electoral system may 
function), and perhaps most importantly, we trust that the losing candidate or party will 
leave office or step aside peacefully until the next election.  Trust is something that can 
be gained and lost, but most importantly under this conception, it has to be earned. 
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The paradox created by Sztompka’s definition is that trust is essential to the 
smooth operation of society and the effective rule of law, yet it is the effective rule of 
law that is required for individuals to have trust and be willing to make that contingent 
bet.  Fair execution of the law is the backup individuals look to when their trust is 
violated.  This observation bears particular importance to Post-Communist Europe where 
corruption, the unequal application of the law, has been shown to depress trust at the 
societal level3 (Uslaner and Badescu 2004). The potential impact of the state on the 
formation of trust and social capital is not limited to the enforcement of laws.  The state 
itself can get the process of creating trust going through its support in creating public and 
private associations (Herreros 2004).  These associations then help create further trust, 
which Herreros (2004) refers to as the “virtuous circle.” 
Uslaner further distinguishes between two types of trust: what he calls strategic 
trust and what he calls moralistic trust.  This distinction is crucial to the study of trust as 
the two are focused on considerably different targets.  Strategic trust is conditional, and 
it is given with the expectation of something being given in return.  It is the sort of trust 
we bestow on people we know…I trust you because you are my friend and because I 
believe that you will also act as a friend to me.  I trust that if I give a movie cashier 6 
dollars, the cashier will allow me to enter the theater and watch the movie. 
Moralistic trust, however, is trust in people we don’t know and is based simply 
on our moral conviction that people can be trusted.  This type of trust is especially 
crucial to our discussion of democracy and governance because it affects society at large 
                                                
3 The opposite is also true, however, and political leadership may also help create trust through setting a 
good example for the public (Lovell 2001). 
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and not our specific sphere of interaction.  Mansbridge (1999) makes a similar 
distinction, dividing trust into predictive trust and altruistic trust.  Altruistic trust is not 
only based on the conviction that trust is a morally positive trait, but that when given in a 
moral fashion that it is beneficial to others.  Where moralistic trust gives a moral reward 
to the individual, altruistic trust gives its rewards to others.   
Each of these generally directed definitions of trust, generalized and altruistic 
trust, take their queue from Easton’s (1975) conception of diffuse support.  Diffuse 
support is support for the political regime in a general sense and is not directed towards 
any particular individual or present office holder. 
There are thought to be two slightly differing explanations as to the role trust 
plays in politics.  The first claim is that trusting individuals should be more likely to 
participate in politics than the distrustful (Stokes 1962; Almond and Verba 1963; Finifter 
1970).  This claim is supported by the fact that a decline in trust in government in the US 
has coincided with a decline in levels of voter-turnout.  This claim has been met with 
sharp criticism, both on the merits of the theory (Miller 1980; Rosenstone and Hansen 
1993), as well as on the measurement (Seligson 1983). 
 The second competing notion is that it is not trust, but distrust that inspires 
political action on the part of the greater public (Gamson 1968; 1975).  The commonly 
cited statement of Gamson’s (1968: 48) is that “a combination of high political efficacy 
and low political trust is the optimum combination for mobilization—a belief that 
influence is both possible and necessary.”  It is this latter explanation that has inspired 
more testing and revision than the first.   
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 A first group of studies examined the link between distrust and both conventional 
forms of participation and unconventional, or protest, forms of participation.  In more 
recent years, studies have looked at how distrust may affect voting behavior and 
participation in campaign activities.  Luks (1998), for example, shows that distrusting 
citizens are not more likely to vote than the trusting, but that they are more likely to 
engage in other types of participation.     
 However, it should be noted that not all scholars hold trust, and social capital in 
general, to be the magic elixir that cures what ails the state.  Ariel Armony (2004) refers 
to the supposedly beneficial connection between social capital and democratization as 
“the dubious link.”  Armony argues that “the cross-national and within country 
variations in the degree of democratization of both political and social spheres leads to 
critical differences in the nature, objectives and outcomes of civil society participation” 
(Armony 2004: 14).  Armony goes on to use the historical cases of Weimar Germany 
and the rise of the Nazi party, the post-war growth of the Klan and other racially focused 
groups in the United States to show that group association can easily be turned to sinister 
ends and display clear anti-democratic tendencies.  He then uses the modern case of 
Argentina to show how non-tolerant and non-trusting associational life can grow up in a 
fledgling “Third Wave” democracy plagued with severe economic inequality and weak 
state structures.  
Others, such as Encarnacion (2003) argue that the institutional framework of a 
country matters much more than the levels of social capital in a country.  Encarnacion 
examines the cases of Spain and Brazil to highlight this point.  On the one hand is Spain, 
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a country with a strong democracy yet a quite low level of associational life, while on 
the other is Brazil, a country with a vibrant associational life and an unsteady democratic 
tradition.  He argues that the constitutional, i.e. institutional, performance of a young 
democracy is much more important than civic society, and civil society will only benefit 
democratization if the right conditions of democratization took place in the first place.  
In the case of Spain, key social groups were a part of democratization from the 
beginning, strengthening democracy from the start and stealing the thunder for later civil 
society groups.  In Brazil, the democratization process begun under military auspices did 
not include civil groups, hence the large number of civic organizations has been 
powerless to aid in further democratization.  These cases give pause to those who might 
blindly look to civil society to solve all of a polity’s problems. 
Trust in post-communist states 
 Now that we have a better understanding of how trust has been viewed in the 
Western world, it might be helpful to briefly review some of the work that has been done 
examining the issues of trust/social capital throughout the post-communist world as a 
whole.  As will be evident, these studies have tended to look to the legacies of the 
communist state and to economics when examining post-communist civic engagement, 
ignoring cleavage attitudes coming out of the transition. 
One might ask why one would bother studying trust in a region where, on the 
surface, trust seems to be in short supply.  Timothy Colton says of the lack of trust in 
Russia, “history predisposes Russians towards mutual mistrust rather than trust and 
toward stoic acceptance of what the government does rather than self-confident 
 17 
influence over it” (Colton 1995: 748).  One may even argue that in fact this “mutual 
mistrust” of the government forms a unifying link between members of the general 
public, a point suggested by Howard (2003) in relation to the enduring mistrust of group 
associations held over from the communist organizations of pre-transition society. 
Continuing to view trust in a historical framework, it has been argued that social 
and political constraints continue to impede the development of social capital in post-
communist societies.  Mondak and Gearing (1998) examine survey data from a 
community in Romania and compare it to the venerable 1984 South Bend, IN survey 
data of Huckfeldt and Sprague (1995).  The authors find that compared to the citizens of 
South Bend, Romanian citizens discuss politics less, participate in politics less, know 
less about their neighbors and do not link the interests of the people to broader political 
judgments.  They attribute these findings to five particular impediments to civic 
engagement which are holdovers from the communist era: the lack of free and open 
political discussion, the lack of roots to the community many respondents did not have, 
the nature of housing in Romania, the poor quality of the news media, and the ethnic 
divisions of the region.  Many of these impediments are not unique to Romania and as 
such one may take from this study that at least in the short term (since this was a 1994 
survey) the recent communist history presents obstacles to full and healthy 
democratization.   
The fears of Mondak and Gearing for the lack of social interaction inhibiting the 
full democratization of Eastern Europe and Colton’s observations on the culture of 
distrust in Russia are certainly valid and may be further applied throughout the region.  
 18 
There is, however, evidence that there is a substantial basis for social capital of a kind 
similar to that found in the West to bloom on the post-communist landscape.  In his 2000 
study, Christopher Marsh employs a methodology attempting to recreate in Russia 
Putnam’s original 1993 analysis of Italy (Putnam 1993).  Marsh (2000) constructs a civic 
community index and a democratization index and finds, consistent with Putnam’s 
Italian findings, that regions in Russia that scored high on the civic community index 
tended to score high on the democratization index as well.  Marsh takes Putnam’s 
findings of social capital benefiting the effectiveness of democratic governments a step 
farther suggesting that social capital can facilitate the democratic development of post-
communist societies as well.  This conclusion then provides a footing for all the post-
communist studies which have followed and suggests that social capital should operate 
in the post-communist world in a similar manner to the way in which it works in the 
advanced industrialized world, despite the “history of mutual mistrust” found in Eastern 
Europe.  
Perhaps the strongest historical evidence for the importance for trust during 
Soviet times comes from examining the phenomenon of blat (Ledeneva 1998).  Blat is 
defined by Ledeneva as “the use of personal networks and informal contacts to obtain 
goods and services in short supply and to find a way around formal procedures4” 
(Ledeneva 1998).  Ledeneva also comments that blat was “…a reaction of ordinary 
people to the structural constraints of the socialist system of distribution – a series of 
                                                
4 It is important to note that this definition may sound a lot like corruption, but Ledeneva explicitly draws 
a line between corrupt practices and blat practices.  Blat has an element of legitimacy given to it by 
general acceptance, while corruption is unacceptable (Ledeneva 1998). 
 19 
practices which enabled the Soviet system to function and made it tolerable, but also 
subverted it” (Ledeneva 1998).  An example would be if you have a cousin who works 
in a theatre company and he gets you tickets for a popular play. You then give these 
tickets to another acquaintance so that that person will agree to allow another friend of 
yours access to the latest shipment of washing machines to the store he owns.  This 
second friend then lets you use his dacha one weekend for a birthday party.  Blat is a 
system of continual favor giving that weaves across relationships to overcome the 
shortages of the economic system.  Because this system of transaction takes place 
outside the control of the state authorities, the Soviet leadership regarded it as corruption 
and even denied its existence for many years.  Because of the technical illegality of blat 
practices, they represented an extreme trust situation because any link in the chain could 
expose it to the authorities. 
Trusting social networks continue to remain vital for the economic welfare of the 
citizens of post-communist states and the poor in particular.  In a study of social 
networks in the Kyrgyz Republic, Kuhenast and Dudwick (2004) find that family 
networks are essential for poor families meeting the expectations demanded of each 
other in certain social situations, such as weddings and birthday parties.  Without the 
extended family network, the poor would be unable to meet the financial demands on 
their own, thus severely damaging the family’s reputation.  This bond within class, the 
author suggest, is stronger then the family bond, as rich family members often eventually 
turn their backs on the poor members out of embarrassment and the awkwardness that 
now accompanies the later constantly asking money from the former.  Thus the rich tend 
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to form their own exclusive social networks (Kuehnast and Dudwick 2004).  A study of 
the Siberian city of Novosibirsk presented similar findings as those in Kyrgyzstan 
(Busse 2001).  Wealthy residents of Novosibirsk are able to put less into the local social 
capital system while poor residents are forced to continue contributing to the social 
capital system and rely on it as their only, or most reliable, capital resource. 
It should be noted also that the importance of social networks is not just the case 
for the poor, but remains true for the middle-classes also.  Ledeneva (1998) points to the 
modern day expression of blat as resulting from citizens attempting to work around the 
constraints of the transitional economy.  Assistance finding jobs, secure business 
financing, obtaining money for everyday expenses, and purchasing for businesses are 
examples of blat in the transitional economy, even if the word itself is largely 
antiquated.   
There is evidence that the citizens in Russia have developed networks with a 
strong political capacity in response to the totalitarianism of the communist era and that 
citizens involved in such networks are more likely to hold important democratic ideals 
(Gibson 2001).  These networks have become crucial to the dissemination of democratic 
ideals across society.  However, it should also be noted that Gibson’s network approach 
downplays the importance of interpersonal trust in determining attitudes towards 
political processes and democratic institutions.  The benefit of these social networks, 
Gibson would argue, is in the teaching of democratic principles and not as incubators of 
trust. 
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Others, however, have found some evidence to the contrary of Gibson (2001).  
Badescu, Sum and Uslaner (2004) test whether social activism in Romania and Moldova 
increased trust at a societal level.  They too find little support for the notion that 
participation leads to greater trust in the mass public, but did find higher levels of trust 
among organizational activists.  They suggest that this elite group may help to spread 
democratic values and trust to the larger population, yet the problem lies in the fact that 
this elite group of activists remain a very small percentage of the population.  The 
benefits of networks to trust appear to be direct benefits and increasing trust through 
some proximity or osmosis remains a disputable notion. 
It has also been suggested that the level of corruption in a society may adversely 
affect trust. Ulsaner and Badescu (2004) examine the relationship between corruption 
and trust in Romania.  They find that the impact of corruption is greater in Sweden, a 
society with low levels of corruption, than in Romania, a society rife with corruption.  
The explanation they advance is that people in Romania have become numb to the 
corruption and accept it as an everyday occurrence, whereas in Sweden it is not 
commonplace and when it does occur it is much more noticeable and offensive to the 
Swedish mind.  However, it should be noted that the authors selected these cases based 
on their extremely opposite polarity, and whether this finding holds up across the 
spectrum of possibilities remains to be seen. 
What are cleavages? 
 The concept of the cleavage is among the oldest in political science.  Numerous 
definitions exist which take the definition beyond a simple division in society.  From 
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these definitions we can see that divisions, or differences, between groups is not enough 
to earn the title of cleavage, let alone give that cleavage pertinent status in the study of 
politics. 
 Rae and Taylor (1970) define cleavages in their classic study as “the criteria 
which divide the members of a community or subcommunity into groups, and the 
relevant cleavages are those which divide members into groups with important political 
differences at specific times and places” (1970: 1).  They further divide cleavages into 
three groups: ascriptive “trait” cleavages (such as race or caste), attitudinal “opinion” 
cleavages (ideology), and behavioral “act” cleavages (shown through voting or 
organizational membership). 
 Most contemporary studies of cleavages begin with the seminal work by Lipset 
and Rokkan (1967) detailing the formation of the party systems and voter alignments in 
Western Europe.  Lipset and Rokkan (1967) conceive of four major cleavage lines that 
resulted from the nation-building and industrialization processes and have “frozen” the 
party systems in Western Europe.  The first pair comes out of the cultural shift from 
empire to independent state and center around the division between the more traditional 
elements of society and the modern elements of society.  The cultural divisions are along 
the lines of Church/State (the classic religious vs. secular view of government and 
society) and Center/Periphery (which refers to the dominant culture in society, back in 
the day it would have referred to the colonizing culture found in the city, and the 
suppressed local culture native to the country found in the peripheral areas of the 
empire.)  In Poland, Habsburg, Russian, or German culture would have been the center 
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culture, depending on where one was, and Polish culture would be the periphery.  The 
second set of cleavages came out of the Industrial Revolution: the first is the 
Urban/Rural split between the industrial cities and the agricultural rural areas, and the 
second is the familiar class split between owners/workers. 
These cleavages are important then because they helped define segments in 
society for mobilization and the political party system matured to speak to each of these 
constituencies. These divisions have remained consistent over generations; so consistent, 
in fact, that Lipset and Rokkan offer that the divisions have “frozen” the party systems, 
and therefore the boundaries of political competition, in Western democracies. 
New issues and cleavages 
 The validity of the “freezing” hypothesis suggested by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) 
has been one of most debated topics in comparative political studies.  Much of the 
discussion, certainly the most vocal side, has been critical of the freezing concept.  
However, Peter Mair (1997) offers a compelling argument in support of Lipset and 
Rokkan that highlights the numerous dimensions along which critics have incorrectly 
viewed “freezing” and have incorrectly tested the hypothesis. 
 The common interpretation of freezing has literally been one of no system 
change whatsoever.  Any evidence of changes in the system has been viewed as proof 
that the freezing hypothesis has been disproved.  Mair (1997), however, sees freezing 
more along the lines of stability.  System change in and of itself does not conflict with 
the freezing hypothesis because the fundamental actors and system of cleavages that 
supports political conflict remains consistent.   
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 An important reason that party systems have been viewed as unfrozen is the 
manner in which the concept is measured.  Mair (1997) notes that electoral results are 
the common metric for testing party system stability.  Yet it is important to realize that 
Lipset and Rokkan were focusing more on the societal cleavage structure upon which the 
political system was built, rather than the politics themselves.  Therefore, for electoral 
results to be applicable, one would have to accept that all changes in societal cleavages 
manifest themselves in the electoral arena.  Mair suggests that this may not be the case. 
 Mair (1997) further argues that European party systems are in fact largely 
“frozen” today and were at the time of Lipset and Rokkan’s writing.  Evidence of this is 
found in the success of the “old” parties’ electoral fortunes over time.  Mair states that 
there is much less electoral volatility than is widely assumed in today’s politics, and that 
old parties continue to dominate the landscape; essentially the argument Lipset and 
Rokkan advocated.  The old parties are able to do this by adapting themselves and their 
message to fit any changes in domestic political priorities.  The same cleavage structures 
exist as ever, but the new issues in politics can be consumed by the old structure and the 
old parties are also able to adapt themselves accordingly. 
 Kilngemann and Wattenberg (1992) address the declining partisan polarization in 
the United States and West Germany and come to different conclusions in each case as 
to the causes.  In the US, the authors suggest, citizens are simply becoming less attached 
to parties as a whole, while in Germany, citizens are moderating their views as they 
become more comfortable with the dominant parties in the system.  This mixed finding 
has opposing implications to the frozen thesis; partisan dealignment in the US might be 
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symptomatic of the system’s inability to address new political issues, while in Germany 
it may be evidence of freezing as the old political parties gain acceptance.  
 Mair’s argument is compelling.  Pieces that are judge Lipset and Rokkan on the 
basis of electoral fortunes as proof of thawing (e.g. Shamir 1984) are missing the point.  
Contemporary party systems may be viewed as stable more so than frozen, and the 
adaptability of political actors to incorporate new issues into existing cleavages is 
essential to this view.  Yet the parties based on the “frozen” cleavages remain the ones 
adapting.  The conclusion may be that Western party systems are more slushy than they 
are frozen. 
An example of a new issues, or set of issues, that has led many to question the 
“frozen” nature of European party systems is postmaterialism.  Societal changes are 
often small, gradual, over a period of time.  After some time has passed, often a number 
of years but occasionally in an instant, these changes amount to such a level that a 
fundamental change in the societies’ political system ensues. Ronald Inglehart famous 
thesis on postmaterialism represents such a massive shift in the political culture of a 
country.  The thesis Inglehart (1971) put forth was that unprecedented economic 
prosperity since WWII has led to a fundamental values shift in advanced industrial 
societies from basic economic pursuits of survival (materialist values) to quality of life 
issues, (postmaterialist values).  Inglehart suggests that this shift is generational in 
nature; pre-war age cohorts have remained more materialist, but post-war cohorts are 
postmaterialist.  This shift towards postmaterialism has replaced the traditional left/right 
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ideological spectrum as the defining cleavage in politics and in society and the result has 
been/will be a shift in support towards leftist parties. 
 Such a change has occurred in the Western, industrial world as incomes have 
risen and the basic needs of life have been extended to many.  Inglehart (1971) argues 
that this societal change has led to a shift in the values of the electorate.  Inglehart 
suggests that prosperity has brought about a change in how the younger generations rank 
their needs.  The so-called “post-materialist” citizen is now concerned with quality of 
life issues, such as the environment and freedom of speech, more so than fighting 
inflation or preserving strict order in society.  Kelley et al. (1985) show how this decline 
in class-consciousness has affected the Labour Party in Great Britain.  The authors 
suggest that economic prosperity has decreased the electoral base of left-wing parties 
such as Labour, but that the Labour was able to adjust its message to voters and reduced 
the potential losses.  This adaptive quality of parties has been consistently supported by 
the parties’ literature. 
 However, it is important to note that the “silent revolution” of Inglehart has been 
met with resistance.  As noted in Ignazi (1992), a “silent counter-revolution” has begun 
in Europe, marked by the rise of extreme right-wing parties.  The shift in cultural 
priorities which serves as the foundation for post-materialism has brought about contrary 
viewpoints.  These ideals have not been sufficiently expressed by established 
conservative parties, and thus parties of the new right (a mix of fascist parties and new 
anti-establishment parties) have achieved modest to surprising electoral success. 
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 Economic development has also played a role in the rise of “left-libertarian” 
parties, which represent both leftist distain for the market place and economic inequality, 
as well as the libertarian desire for individual autonomy and distrust of central 
bureaucracy (Kitschelt 1988).  The shift towards post-material values has also led to the 
success of left parties running on such a platform, which in turn leads to left 
participation in government.  This participation helps create conditions in society for 
left-libertarian parties to thrive as the left now takes ownership of the perceived 
problems in society. 
These observations lead to the question of whether the cleavage is rendered 
irrelevant as a political force in contemporary politics.  Elff (2007) studies cleavage 
based voting over a 25-year period in seven Western Europe states.  He argues that 
reports of the death of cleavage voting are overstated and finds evidence that religious-
secular voting has remained a stable force while class voting has seen a sharp decline in 
only a few countries.  Rather than point to the death of the cleavage as a reason behind 
electoral volatility, Elff suggests instead that changes in party competition and emphasis 
on cleavage issues over time in certain countries have led to a decline in direct cleavage-
based voting choices.  Parties have altered their message and the public has responded 
accordingly, but the classic set of cleavages remain a factor in politics. 
Cleavages in post-communist states 
The cleavages spelled out by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) have been politically 
mobilized and as such have long ago formed the basis for party competition in Western 
Europe.  The development of multi-party democracy in Western Europe paralleled the 
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importance of these cleavages and in many ways institutionalized them into society.  
How does this compare to the development of cleavages in Eastern and Central Europe?  
The two central geneses of the “frozen” cleavages, according to Lipset and Rokkan 
(1967) were the Industrial Revolution and the end of the era of great European empires.  
Each of these events played out very differently in the East then they did in the West. It 
is reasonable to hypothesize, therefore, that the impact of these cleavages might be 
different in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe. 
 Eastern and Central Europe has been referred to as the “Lands in Between” (Batt 
2003), and this observation holds on multiple levels.  In the geographical sense, the term 
describes the area as in between historically great powers Germany and Russia, between 
Europe and Asia, between East and West.  However, the term also applies to the region 
in the political sense through out much of its history.  The area had the distinction of 
being colonies of empires rather than colonial empires.  Rule over these lands, and 
therefore the dominant culture during this period, was a culture imported from the heart 
of the great empire, be it Prussian, Russian, Austrian and to a lesser degree Ottoman.  
The battle between dominant cultures, then, was one of foreign occupier and native 
occupied. 
 This situation differs greatly from that in the West.  The West was made up of 
colonial empires and therefore exhibited a greater cultural presence over its holdings.  
The primary cultural tension in the West was, as described by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) 
to be intra-state between the urban and rural spheres of society.  Therefore, with East and 
West experiencing different foci for their cleavage development, and experiencing 
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democratization at different periods in their development as nation-states, it is 
reasonable to expect different cleavages to react differently in the attitudes of Eastern 
Europeans and Western Europeans.   
 The first cleavage is the libertarian/authoritarian cleavage identified by Kitschelt 
et al. (1999), Lewis (2000) and Moreno (1999).  This cleavage can be most directly be 
measured by questioning individual on his/her perceptions of the authoritarian past and 
thoughts on the manner of transition away from communist rule.  Authoritarian attitudes 
may be seen on both the far left and far right in post-communist states, and can be 
attributed to both lingering commitment to communist ideals and new found expressions 
of nationalism (Miller, White and Heywood 1998).  This libertarian/authoritarian divide 
has clearly manifested itself in party choice and Miller, White and Heywood (1998) 
suggest that this division provided more stability to the developing party systems in post-
communist states more so than the re-establishment of pre-communist parties. 
 The second cleavage is the political reformist cleavage.  Time has rendered this 
importance of this cleavage less vital as the reform process, at least in the four countries 
under examination in this study, has gone beyond the point of no return.  The economies, 
political structures and openness of society in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and 
Slovenia have largely, if not completely, moved towards western standards and the 
question of reform has lost much of its luster in the face of the EU ascension process.  
Where Eastern European political leaders may have lacked the will to reform, the EU 
coerced reform (Grabbe 2006; Vaduchova 2005).  As the results of these reforms have 
largely been a success, whether one is in favor of the reforms or not becomes a moot 
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point.  What is relevant is how one views the state of government or services in the wake 
of the reforms.  For this reason, I will substitute satisfaction with the present state of the 
political order for the political reform cleavages advanced by Moreno. 
The third cleavage addresses the socially liberal/fundamentalist attitudes.  This 
cleavage speaks to the overall level of conservativism in social attitudes versus the more 
open and liberal social views.  Moreno (1999) includes into his categorization of liberal 
– fundamentalist views religiosity and nationalism, leaving the more classic definition of 
liberalism to the economic sphere.  Kitschelt (1995) also notes that both law and order 
and morality issues are found in post-communist social discussion and interact with both 
nationalist and liberalist ideologies.  As liberal views are generally thought to 
incorporate more of a “live and let live” approach to society and fundamentalist views 
are less accepting of deviation, the effects on trust should also highlight this.  The liberal 
view takes as one of its foundations a more optimistic view of human nature, while 
fundamentalism takes a more pessimistic view – requiring social institutions to guide 
behavior in some way. 
Lastly, as the economic left-right cleavage has developed among post-communist 
states in a manner similar to that in Western European states (Markowski 1997, 
Tworzecki 2002).  The importance of the economic left – right cleavage speaks to the 
economic transition in post-communist states as creating “winners and losers”.  Tucker, 
Pacek and Berinsky (2002) in their study of support for the European Union suggest that 
the EU serves as a guarantor of economic reforms in the member countries and that 
citizens who have been “winners” in the economic transition will be more likely to 
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support EU membership for their countries.  These winners will support EU membership 
because they assume that the EU will foster further economic expansion and the winners 
will continue to be winners.  The winners and losers division has also been applied in the 
post-communist world with respect to support for parties (Tucker 2001; Fidrmuc 2000; 
Gibson and Cielecka 1995; Evans and Whitefield 1993; Kitschelt 1992), electoral 
participation (Bohrer, Pacek and Radcliff 2000) and support for incumbent post-
communist governments (Powers and Cox 1997).  
The benefits of social engagement 
An important aspect of classic social capital theory has long asserted that high 
levels of social engagement are good for democracy.  It has also been suggested that 
trust and social engagement are locked in a reinforcing relationship (Brehm and Rahn 
1997).  Social engagement, both formal and informal, had a unique importance to life in 
communist societies and that legacy might suggest that engagement may affect trust 
differently than in the West.   
 Social engagement with politics is at the heart of democracy.  Engagement gives 
the democratic process its legitimacy, and as such the observed decline in various forms 
of political participation across democracies worldwide has troubled researchers. 
However, not all engagement must be explicitly associated with politics for the benefits 
to affect the political health of a democracy.  Social engagement in and of itself is 
considered beneficial to democracy.  The reasons for this point to the general benefits 
associated with group association.   
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 The first such benefit is that group association lowers information costs.  Social 
groups, like political parties or interest groups, are effective “agents of political 
socialization” in that they provide information to members that help shape attitudes on 
politics (Almond and Verba 1963).  The information benefits of group association are 
amplified by the reinforcement that takes place when members surround themselves with 
others of a similar background, ideological belief, or simply interest in what that 
association is built around  (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993).  It has been argued that 
people with greater resources such as time, money and knowledge are more likely to 
participate in politics (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995).  The potential social groups 
have to increase information, thus knowledge, for their members is particularly relevant 
to an active democratic citizenry. 
 A second benefit coming from involvement in formal group associations is the 
gaining of experience with compromise and decision-making (Newton 2001; Verba, 
Schlozman and Brady 1995).  Active involvement in an organization has the potential to 
expose members to different types of people with different socio-economic backgrounds, 
ideological positions and learning to accommodate such different types of members 
becomes a useful democratic skill.  Members gain experience listening to alternative 
viewpoints, build consensus, and set group goals.  All of these skills are directly 
relatable to democratic participation.   
 It should be noted, however, that there is likely be a selection bias at work 
between the trusting and active in civic organizations. Studies have show that people 
who join civic organizations tend to be more trusting that those who are not active 
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(Stolle 1998; 2001; Uslaner 1999).   This is one of the many reasons the causal direction 
between membership and trust remains unclear.  The murky relationship between the 
two fundamental underpinnings of social capital theory has led some to question the very 
direction of research on the subject (Jackman and Miller 1998). 
Social engagement in Communist and post–communist societies 
While the benefits of social engagement in fostering trust and building social 
capital in advanced western democracies have been thoroughly debated, the legacy of 
social engagement is considerably different in East Central Europe.  The nature of 
associations during the communist period made for an environment where formality was 
viewed with suspicion and informality was the norm.  This skepticism has lingered into 
the post-communist period and leads us to ask just how far the assumptions of the 
Western model extend into this distrustful region. 
An important distinction between totalitarian regimes, such as communist 
regimes, and strictly authoritarian regimes is the crucial role that mass participation 
plays in the survival of totalitarian regimes.  In strictly authoritarian states, mass 
participation is depressed through any means necessary.  Yet in totalitarian regimes, 
regimes, whose purpose is not only to maintain control but convert society towards an 
ideological orthodoxy, mass participation is essential (Hague and Harrop 2004).  In the 
case of communist systems, the values learned through party membership have not been 
considered to be beneficial to democratic participation nor support for democracy 
(DiFrancesco and Gitelman 1984).  However, research has shown there to be a lack of 
influence of Communist party membership and democratic values (Gibson, Duch and 
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Tedin 1992) and there has been shown to be a positive relationship between prior 
Communist party membership and participation in the post-communist era (Letki 2004).  
This latter finding suggests that the skills learned even in a totalitarian organization can 
still translate into useful skills in a democratic setting. 
Just as interpersonal trust in Post-Communist Europe has been found to be low, 
so too are the levels of associational group membership.  Howard (2003) has argued that 
the low civic associational numbers may be attributed to three primary factors: the 
persistence of mistrust of communist organizations, the ongoing strength of informal 
friendship networks, and widespread disappointment with the post-communist 
transitions. The disappointment many people have felt with the political and economic 
transitions has left them wary of joining associations as they see these associations as 
part of the new order and, as such, as ineffective in meeting their needs.  Part of 
Howard’s argument is that more informal modes of interaction between citizens have 
filled that void that the lack of formal organizations has created and this speaks to the 
importance of informal relationship in the communist past. 
Theory 
The theory presented in this dissertation stresses two key aspects of post-
communist life that I argue affect generalized trust: attitudes stemming from cleavages 
associated with the transition, and the importance of informal relationships to everyday 
life. First let us examine the cleavage argument.  I suggest that the three cleavages 
identified earlier, authoritarian attitudes on government and custom, socially 
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fundamentalist attitudes, and dissatisfaction with the state of government reforms have a 
negative relationship with generalized trust 
As mentioned earlier, the existence alone of a division in society is not sufficient 
for that division to be considered a viable political cleavage.  That cleavage must either 
have the ability to be, or have been, mobilized to political ends (Bartolini and Mair 
1990).  The cleavages spelled out by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) have been mobilized as 
such and, they argue, long ago formed the basis for party competition in Western 
Europe.  The development of multi-party democracy in Western Europe paralleled the 
importance of these cleavages and in many ways institutionalized them into society. 
 How does this compare to the development of these same cleavages in Eastern 
and Central Europe?  The two central geneses of cleavages development, according to 
Lipset and Rokkan (1967) were the Industrial Revolution and the end of the era of great 
European empires.  Each of these events played out very differently in the East than they 
did in the West. It is reasonable to hypothesize, therefore, that the impact of these 
cleavages should be different in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe. 
 Politics in Post-Communist Europe can be seen as a means of reducing, or 
eliminating, the uncertainty citizens are thrown into by the transition from communist 
rule.  The three attitudes I argue as having a negative effect on trust all have one thing in 
common, they are shortcuts to reducing uncertainty.  Authoritarian attitudes reduce 
uncertainty by placing importance in a strong government to at best control behavior, 
and at worse punish deviation from order.  Socially fundamentalist attitudes reduce 
uncertainty by looking to a tightly defined set of norms of behavior to control the 
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behavior of others.  Religious attachment does so by looking to God for guidance, 
reward and punishment.  Nationalists look to their own native population to enforce 
continuity of behavior and custom and fear the pernicious effects of the outsider.  
Finally, the dissatisfied express their desire to reduce uncertainty through their contrary 
approach to the existing political order.  Things are bad, I feel uncomfortable in my 
position, and the current state of affairs must change because the existing order is not 
getting the job done.  
 The second part of my argument is that post-communist citizens further look to 
reduce uncertainty in their lives through their network of informal relationships and not 
through formal associational activities.  The role that associational life played during the 
Communist era was substantially different than it was in Western democracies.  Where 
Western associational life is something that existed outside of, and often in support of, 
the democratic process, in communist states such associations existed as a further means 
of control by the Party.  
As noted in the review of the state of post-communist associational life, 
membership in activist groups is low and distrust of formal organizations remains high 
as a lingering effect from the communist era.  Post-communist individuals are noted for 
their cold public demeanor, and yet this is balanced by their steadfast loyalty as friends.  
I argue that those with closer informal networks should exhibit higher levels of trust, as 
these networks exist to help overcome, or manage, the uncertainty of their lives.  This 
effect is also potentially much broader than the associational effect suggested by 
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Western cases.  While associational membership is low in Post-Communist Europe, 
everyone, presumably, has at least a few friends. 
 Whether post-communist cleavage attitudes and informal social engagement 
affect generalized trust or not will be tested in the next two empirical chapters.  On both 
accounts, however, substantial differences exist between Western and East – Central 
Europe.  It is reasonable to think that these differences will show a different effect on 
trust than has been found in older established democracies.  If little difference is found 
then it may very well be the case that the strength of the mechanics of trust found in the 
West have been able to overcome the peculiarities of the post-communist region. 
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CHAPTER III 
POST–COMMUNIST CLEAVAGE ATTITUDES AND TRUST 
If the post-communist cleavages identified in the theory chapter bear any 
relevance to the political landscape in Central Eastern Europe, then what effect might 
they have on generalized trust in the region?  The analysis in this chapter asks that very 
question.  Another natural question to begin with is just how trusting or distrusting are 
the post-communist states of Central Eastern Europe in relation to the West?  When one 
examines Table 3.1 it is evident that there is a broad gap in general levels of trust 
between the four countries of Central Eastern Europe included in this study and the 
seventeen countries of Western Europe.  All four countries had state-level mean trust 
scores noticeably lower than the countries of Western Europe.5  The exceptions were the 
Southern European states of Greece and Portugal, whose scores registered lowest in the 
study apart from Poland.  The highest levels of trust were found, perhaps unsurprisingly, 
in the four Scandinavian countries.  
Theory and hypotheses 
As mentioned earlier, the existence alone of a division in society is not sufficient 
for that division to be considered a viable political cleavage.  That cleavage must either 
have the ability to be, or have been, mobilized to political ends (Bartolini and Mair 
1990).  The cleavages spelled out by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) have been mobilized as 
such and, they argue, long ago formed the basis for party competition in Western 
                                                
5 Trust scores are means of a 0-10 point scale with higher values indicating higher generalized trust. 
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Europe.  The development of multi-party democracy in Western Europe paralleled the 
importance of these cleavages and in many ways institutionalized them into society. 
 
 
 
Table 3.1: Mean Trust Levels by Country 
  
Country Generalized Trust 
  
Denmark 6.87 
Norway 6.61 
Finland 6.49 
Sweden 6.07 
Netherlands 5.74 
Ireland 5.69 
Switzerland 5.66 
Luxembourg 5.11 
Austria 5.09 
United Kingdom 5.09 
Spain 4.88 
Belgium 4.80 
Germany 4.68 
France 4.50 
Italy 4.41 
Czech Republic 4.19 
Hungary 4.05 
Slovenia 4.05 
Portugal 3.93 
Greece 3.77 
Poland 3.66 
  
Source: European Social Survey v. 1 and 2. 
 
 
  
 
How does this compare to the development of these same cleavages in Eastern 
and Central Europe?  The two central geneses of cleavages development, according to 
Lipset and Rokkan (1967) were the Industrial Revolution and the end of the era of great 
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European empires.  Each of these events played out very differently in the East then they 
did in the West. It is reasonable to hypothesize, therefore, that the impact of these 
cleavages might be different in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe. 
Eastern and Central Europe has been referred to as the “Lands in Between” (Batt 
2003), and this observation holds on multiple levels.  In the geographical sense, the term 
describes the area as in between historically great powers Germany and Russia, between 
Europe and Asia, between East and West.  However, the term also applies to the region 
in the political sense through out much of its history.  The area had the distinction of 
being colonies of empires rather than colonial empires.  Rule over these lands, and 
therefore the dominant culture during this period, was a culture imported from the heart 
of the great empire, be it Prussian, Russian, Austrian and to a lesser degree Ottoman.  
The battle between dominant cultures, then, was one of foreign occupier and native 
occupied. 
 This situation differs greatly from that in the West.  The West was made up of 
colonial empires and therefore exhibited a greater cultural presence over its holdings.  
The primary cultural tension in the West was, as described by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) 
to be intra-state between the urban and rural spheres of society.  Therefore, with East and 
West experiencing different foci for their cleavage development, and experiencing 
democratization at different periods in their development as nation-states, it is 
reasonable to expect different cleavages to react differently in the attitudes of Eastern 
Europeans and Western Europeans. 
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The analysis in this chapter will test hypotheses aimed at focusing on the effects 
particular attitudes, or groups of cleavage attitudes, have on generalized trust.  Three sets 
of cleavage attitudes that have been identified as being particularly salient in post-
communist societies will be tested: more specifically, politically libertarian vs. 
authoritarian attitudes, political reformist attitudes, and socially liberal vs. 
fundamentalist attitudes.  The analysis will also include attitudes from the cleavage 
arguably the most salient of the “classic” Lipset and Rokkan cleavage set: church vs. 
state (secular) attitudes.   
 The first cleavage is the libertarian/authoritarian cleavage identified by Kitschelt 
et al. (1999), Lewis (2000) and Moreno (1999).  This cleavage can be most directly be 
measured by questioning the respondent on his/her perceptions of the authoritarian past 
and thoughts on the manner of transition away from communist rule.  The European 
Social Survey (ESS), however, does not ask such questions, so instead I use questions 
that address the general level of authoritarian attitudes the respondent holds.  These 
questions address attitudes concerning state power and deference to authority or 
tradition, on the one hand, vs. individual freedom on the other.  From this we test our 
first hypothesis: 
 H1: Authoritarian attitudes have a negative affect on generalized trust. 
To test these libertarian – authoritarian attitudes we use two measures.  The first 
is an index of questions associated with obedience to tradition, the perceived importance 
of having a strong state to maintain order, the importance of doing what one wants, the 
importance of following the rules, and the importance of people “behaving properly.”  
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The second measure is suggested by Moreno (1999) is the attitude that the government 
should be active in reducing income inequality.  This measure taps into the belief of 
having a strong state to provide security, in the fullest sense, versus a more libertarian 
“sink or swim” attitude.   
 The second cleavage I test is the political reformist cleavage.  Time has rendered 
this importance of this cleavage less vital as the reform process, at least in the four 
countries under examination in this study, has gone beyond the point of no return. The 
reform cleavage, as suggested by Moreno (1999) included many aspects of the political, 
economic and social transition away from the communist system.  The economies, 
political structures and openness of society in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and 
Slovenia have largely, if not completely, moved towards western standards.   
 What I would argue has taken its place within these countries is not a reform or 
non-reform dichotomy, but views on reform within the free market/democratic system.  
This can be measured using attitudes on satisfaction with various aspects of the political 
and economic systems.  This suggest our second hypothesis: 
 H2: Satisfaction with the political order has a positive affect on generalized trust. 
 To measure these attitudes we use a reformist – satisfaction index constructed 
using questions asking the respondent’s level of satisfaction with democracy, satisfaction 
with the economy, satisfaction with the government, satisfaction with the education 
system and satisfaction with the nation’s health system. 
The third cleavage we test addresses the socially liberal/fundamentalist cleavage.  
This cleavage speaks to the overall level of conservativism in social attitudes versus the 
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more open and liberal social views.  Moreno (1999) includes into his categorization of 
liberal – fundamentalist views religiosity and nationalism, leaving the more classic 
definition of liberalism to the economic sphere.  Kitschelt (1995) also notes that both law 
and order and morality issues are found in post-communist social discussion and interact 
with both nationalist and liberalist ideologies.  As liberal views are generally thought to 
incorporate more of a “live and let live” approach to society and fundamentalist views 
are less accepting of deviation, the effects on trust should also highlight this.  The liberal 
view takes as one of its foundations a more optimistic view of human nature, while 
fundamentalism takes a more pessimistic view – requiring social institutions to guide 
behavior in some way.  Thus, our third hypothesis is: 
 H3: Liberal social attitudes will exert a positive influence on generalized trust. 
 I use three separate measures of liberal – fundamentalist attitudes.  The first is the 
respondent’s views towards gay rights, i.e. the ability of homosexuals to live life as they 
wish.  The second measure is an index of questions asking the respondent’s views 
towards immigration.  The items focus on the extent to which the respondent feels that 
immigration harms or enriches the state economy and cultural identity of the state.  The 
third measure is a religiosity index asking respondent how religious he/she would say 
he/she is, frequency of church attendance and frequency of prayer outside of church. 
Lastly, as the economic left-right cleavage has developed among post-communist 
states in a manner similar to that in Western European states, we will also test for this 
cleavage using self-placement of the respondent’s ideology on the left-right scale.  
Leading us to suggest our final hypothesis: 
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H4: Right leaning ideological attitudes will exert a negative influence on 
generalized trust. 
 I also include standard demographic controls for, age, gender, years of formal 
education and two measures of their household economic well-being: a subjective 
measure of income satisfaction and an objective measure of household income.  
Data and methods 
 The data in this analysis come from the two rounds of the European Social 
Survey (ESS) conducted in 2002 and 2004.  I will compare the results between four 
post-communist states, specifically the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia, 
as well as a joint model of all four countries.  
 The dependent variable is generalized trust, and this will be measured using the 
standard generalized trust question commonly used by Uslaner, and others, which asks 
respondents whether people can generally be trusted or can one never be too careful. 
While the question as found in the World Value Survey (WVS) has become the most 
common measure of generalized trust used in the literature, I argue that the version of 
this question asked in the ESS is a superior measure to the same question utilized by the 
WVS.  The reason for this is that the ESS version of this question is asked along a 11-
point scale, while the WVS question is a dichotomous variable asking respondents an 
either-or estimation of trust. Trust is surely a more nuanced emotion than a simple 
dichotomous variable can fully portray.   
To illustrate this point, consider Table 3.2.  Table 3.2 presents the distribution of 
answers to the standard generalized trust question (question a165) taken from waves 3 
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and 4 of the WVS.  One can clearly see a preponderance of distrust worldwide as only 
27 percent felt that their fellow man could generally be trusted, compared to 73 percent 
exercising caution.  These results may not seem particularly startling, but Table 3.2 also 
presents the distribution of answers to a similar question to the generalized trust question 
asked in only select countries.  This question (g007) asks respondents whether they trust 
other people in their country and ask respondents to answer along a 5-point scale.  The 
results of this question show a very different picture of trust than the generalized 
question shows.  Over 63 percent of the respondents expressed either “complete” or “a 
little” trust towards their countrymen, while only 10 percent expressed either very little 
or no trust whatsoever.  While the second trust question does contain a nationalist 
element to its wording, I submit that that does not fully account for the differences in 
trust levels, but rather the limiting “all or nothing” nature of the standard trust question 
pushes those respondents with any hesitation or caution into the distrusting column.  The 
11-point scale used in the ESS provides much more latitude for respondents than the 
WVS measure. 
The independent variables are a collection of attitudinal questions that tap into 
the broad cleavages specified in the hypothesis section, as well as constructed additive 
indices of these cleavage concepts.6  When possible we have used questions identified 
by Moreno (1999) as being associated with a particular cleavage, but while the ESS does 
replicate many questions found in the WVS it does not do so completely.  In those 
                                                
6 Exact question wording may be found in Appendix A. 
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instances I have used other questions that I feel tap into the appropriate cleavage 
concept. 
 
 
 
Table 3.2: Distribution of Trust Responses – World Values Survey 
  
Can Most People Be Trusted or Can 
You Never Be Too Careful? 
Percent 
  
Most people can be trusted 26.89 
You need to be very careful 73.11 
  
Do you trust other people in your country?  
  
Trust completely 15.34 
Trust a little 48.34 
Neither trust nor distrust 26.52 
Do not trust very much 8.28 
Do not trust at all 1.51 
  
Source: Waves 3 and 4 of the World Values Survey. 
 
 
 
Results 
 The first set of models uses the individual, generalized trust question popularized 
by Uslaner as the measure of trust.  The results of this set of models are presented in 
Table 3.3.  The data were analyzed using Two-Stage Least Squares  (2SLS) with 
linearized standard errors. The first model presented is the joint model of all four post-
communist states of Central/Eastern Europe as the collection of cases.  The second 
model examines the Czech Republic, the third Hungary, the fourth Poland and the fifth 
Slovenia, respectively.  All five models perform well and serve to explain a modest 
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amount of the variance within the dataset, with R-squared statistics of 0.14, 0.16, 0.17, 
0.11 and 0.16, respectively. 
 Hypothesis 1 suggested that authoritarian attitudes would exhibit a negative 
impact on an individual’s generalized trust.  We see in Table 3.3 that this hypothesis has 
been supported in the combined model and in Poland and Slovenia with high 
significance exhibited in each.  The positive coefficient shows that as one’s authoritarian 
index score increased, indicating lesser collective authoritarian beliefs and higher 
libertarian beliefs, interpersonal trust increased.  In other words, when the respondent 
held more libertarian and less authoritarian attitudes, the respondent showed a higher 
level of trust.   
A second measure of authoritarian attitudes asked the respondent how active the 
government should be in reducing income inequality in society.  Table 3.3 shows that 
collectively across the Eastern European states, the more a respondent disagreed with the 
government playing an active role in reducing income disparity the greater their level of 
generalized trust.  This provides additional support for Hypothesis 1.  However, when 
broken down by individual country, it was only in the Czech Republic that this effect 
was appreciable.  The classic left-right economic dimension, founded on government 
intervention in the economy, is a strong presence in Czech politics (Tworzecki 2002) 
and thus it is not surprising that this relationship would surface.  It is some what 
surprising, though, that it was not statistically significant in Hungary or Slovenia, two 
countries that also have a strong connection to the classic left-right economic view of 
politics. 
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Table 3.3: Effects of Cleavage Attitudes on Generalized Trust 
      
Independent 
Variable 
Joint Czech 
Republic 
Hungary Poland Slovenia 
      
Left-Right  
Ideology Scale 
     0.04*** 
(0.01) 
 0.05* 
(0.03) 
     0.11*** 
(0.04) 
 0.04* 
(0.02) 
- 0.03 
   (0.03) 
Homosexuality    - 0.07*** 
(0.03) 
- 0.07 
  (0.05) 
- 0.03 
  (0.06) 
- 0.04 
   (0.04) 
- 0.11* 
 (0.06) 
Gov’t Role 
Reducing Income 
Inequality 
 
     0.07*** 
(0.03) 
 
    0.11** 
(0.05) 
 
0.12 
(0.10) 
 
0.02 
(0.05) 
 
0.08 
(0.07) 
Religiosity - 0.00 
  (0.00) 
- 0.00 
  (0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
Authoritarianism      0.04*** 
(0.01) 
- 0.02 
  (0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
   0.04** 
(0.02) 
     0.09*** 
(0.02) 
Immigration      0.04*** 
(0.01) 
     0.04*** 
(0.01) 
     0.08*** 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
     0.05*** 
(0.02) 
Political Reform      0.07*** 
(0.00) 
     0.09*** 
(0.01) 
      0.05*** 
(0.01) 
     0.07*** 
(0.01) 
     0.06*** 
(0.01) 
Environment    - 0.13*** 
(0.04) 
- 0.10 
  (0.07) 
0.02 
(0.10) 
    - 0.21*** 
(0.06) 
- 0.06 
  (0.07) 
Level of 
Household 
Income 
   0.05** 
(0.02) 
- 0.05 
  (0.04) 
0.09 
(0.07) 
    0.09** 
(0.03) 
 0.09* 
(0.05) 
Satisfaction with 
Household 
Income 
      0.20*** 
(0.04) 
     0.32*** 
(0.08) 
    0.24** 
(0.12) 
0.11 
(0.08) 
   0.23** 
(0.09) 
Male - 0.01 
  (0.06) 
0.05 
(0.11) 
- 0.12 
   (0.15) 
- 0.13 
  (0.10) 
   0.29** 
(0.12) 
Age  - 0.00** 
(0.00) 
 - 0.01** 
(0.00) 
- 0.01 
  (0.00) 
    - 0.01*** 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
Level of 
Education 
      0.17*** 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.07) 
      0.20*** 
(0.06) 
     0.15*** 
(0.03) 
     0.16*** 
(0.05) 
      
Constant 0.36 
(0.26) 
   1.30** 
(0.52) 
- 0.71 
  (0.65) 
   1.18** 
(0.48) 
- 0.98* 
 (0.56) 
      
! 
R
2 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.11 0.16 
N 5,854 1,499 795 2,042 1,518 
 
10.* !p   05.** !p   01.*** !p  
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 Hypothesis 2 provided the strongest support across all five models of any of the 
hypotheses. Hypothesis 2 argued that attitudes indicating greater satisfaction with the 
broader political order, the greater the individual’s generalized trust.  The political 
reform index was constructed so that greater satisfaction with the government and 
services would result in a higher index score.  Less satisfaction, and thus an implicit 
desire for some level of reform, would result in a low score.  The strongly significant 
coefficient indicates that, indeed, as respondents expressed more satisfaction with the 
level of democracy, the state of health care, the state of the education, the state of the 
economy and with the government, put broadly, they also were more trusting.  Support 
for the existing political order was the only single variable to demonstrate an impact 
across all four countries.  An interesting observation as these four states are viewed as 
the most successful post-communist states in terms of democratic and free-market 
reforms.  The conclusion to be drawn in this instance is surely that to instill greater trust 
among the people, it helps to have a reform process that has the support of the people 
and is considered a success. 
 Hypothesis 3 argued that more liberal social beliefs along the 
liberal/fundamentalist cleavage would exhibit a positive influence on interpersonal trust.  
To test this hypothesis, four measures of fundamentalist attitudes were used: attitudes 
towards immigration, attitudes towards freedoms for homosexuals, degree of religiosity 
and attitudes towards the environment.   
The first measure is the immigration index, an index testing overall attitudes 
towards the benefits or harms done to society and the economy by immigration.  A 
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positive outlook towards immigration, that immigration adds to one’s national culture 
and benefits the economy should be expressed in greater generalized trust.  We see in 
Table 3.3 that in four of the five models the immigration index displayed a positive and 
highly significant impact on trust, thus supporting Hypothesis 3. The lone exception was 
in Poland, which is surprising given the homogeneity of Polish society. 
 The second measure gauging liberal – fundamentalist attitudes is the 
respondent’s attitudes towards homosexual freedoms.  Following Hypothesis 3, liberal 
views towards the rights of homosexuals to freely express their sexuality should lead to 
increased trust.  Table 3.3 indicates that this is the case in the combined model of all four 
states, as negative coefficient expresses more fundamentalist views bearing a negative 
effect on trust.  However, the only individual state where this was the case was in 
Slovenia.  Hypothesis 3 is this case was supported in the most general sense. 
 The third measure of liberal – fundamentalist views is an index of religiosity 
based on frequency of church attendance, frequency of prayer outside of church and 
overall feeling of “religiousness.”  This measure is particularly interesting as the 
religious – secular division is one of the core cleavages from Lipset and Rokkan (1967).  
Greater religiosity is an indication of more fundamentalist attitudes and should exhibit a 
negative effect on trust.  This measure, however, failed to achieve significance in 
Eastern European states.  This in and of itself is an interesting finding as Eastern Europe 
is generally regarded as a very religiously conservative part of the world, and many have 
argued that the religion – secular cleavage is one that still bears importance in Eastern 
Europe. 
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 The last measure of liberal – fundamentalist attitudes is the respondent’s overall 
feelings of environmentalism.  The less importance the respondent displays towards 
environmental protection, the less trusting they should be.  We see this notion is 
supported in the combined Eastern Europe model and in particular in Poland.   
The next test is Hypothesis 4, which suggested that attitudes towards the right of 
the classic left – right political ideology cleavage would exert a negative influence on 
trust.  This hypothesis was not supported as the effect was in fact exactly the opposite.  
This finding is not wholly unexpected, however, when one considers the support 
generally found for Hypothesis 1.  Respondents identifying with the right were also 
more likely to indicate a stronger preference for authoritarian attitude.  It may well be 
that this preference for some greater force to lessen the uncertainties in life produces 
greater trust as the uncertainty in personal relationships is lessened. 
 Finally, standard demographic variables were controlled for.  Specifically, age, 
gender (a male dummy variable), years of education and income (an objective measure 
of total household income and a subjective measure of satisfaction with income).  We 
see that the gender variable displayed a largely insignificant effect on trust across all of 
the states expect Slovenia.  In this case, men were considerably more trusting than 
women.  Age exhibited significant negative effects across three of the models yet the 
effects were substantively negligible.  A higher level of formal education displayed one 
of the strongest and most consistent effects on trust in all states save the Czech Republic, 
while greater household income, both in actual and perceived terms, also positively 
affected generalized trust.   
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Conclusion 
 The models tested here examined the effects of attitudes reflecting important 
political cleavages in post-communist countries and compared those effects across the 
four states in the study.  I find considerable support for the hypotheses, particularly as 
related to the libertarian – authoritarian and liberal – fundamentalist cleavages. 
Along these lines, it would be helpful to expand the collection of post-communist 
states beyond the four we examine here.  The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and 
Slovenia represent, arguably, the most successful of the post-communist states and that 
success may dampen any differences in attitudes between Western and Eastern Europe.  
Yet the fact remains that the four post-communist states did exhibit the lowest overall 
trust scores in the collection of cases, and the fact that the findings were consistent 
across high trust and low trust countries gives reason for optimism.  Future researchers 
would be well advised to continue this line of study to post-communist countries outside 
of the European Union to provide greater variation along all variables.   
 The analysis using the standard trust question yielded some important findings.  
Attitudes that largely express a lack of trust are those that are less accepting of 
uncertainty and have at their core a need for some order to be imposed, be it from the 
State, from social custom or from a change in the political status quo.  In the next 
chapter I will shift the focus to the role that formal and informal forms of social 
engagement play in developing interpersonal trust.  On the one hand, informal 
association bore particular importance to Central and Eastern European states during the 
communist era, and on the other we have developed an understanding of the benefits of 
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formal association from the study of trust in the United States and Western Europe.  Do 
these same benefits apply to the post-communist states?   
 
 
 54 
CHAPTER IV 
SOCIAL ENGAGEMENT AND TRUST 
An important aspect of classic social capital theory has long asserted that high 
levels of social engagement are good for democracy.  It has also been suggested that 
trust and social engagement are locked in a reinforcing relationship (Brehm and Rahn 
1997).  The previous chapter examined how individual attitudes associated with the 
transition to democracy have affected generalized trust.  This analysis will introduce 
modes of social engagement into the discussion and ask whether the conventional 
wisdom for the benefits of engagement towards trust hold in post-communist states in 
the same manner they do among established democracies.  Social engagement, both 
formal and informal, had a unique importance to life in communist societies and that 
legacy might suggest that engagement may affect trust differently than in the West.   
The benefits of social engagement 
 Social engagement with politics is at the heart of democracy.  Engagement gives 
the democratic process its legitimacy, and as such the observed decline in various forms 
of political participation across democracies worldwide has troubled researchers. 
However, not all engagement must be explicitly associated with politics for the benefits 
to affect the political health of a democracy.  Social engagement in and of itself is 
considered beneficial to democracy.  The reasons for this point to the general benefits 
associated with group association.   
 The first such benefit is that group association lowers information costs.  Social 
groups, like political parties or interest groups, are effective “agents of political 
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socialization” in that they provide information to members that help shape attitudes on 
politics (Almond and Verba 1963).  The information benefits of group association are 
amplified by the reinforcement that takes place when members surround themselves with 
others of a similar background, ideological belief, or simply interest in what that 
association is built around  (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993).  It has been argued that 
people with greater resources such as time, money and knowledge are more likely to 
participate in politics (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995).  The potential social groups 
have to increase information, thus knowledge, for their members is particularly relevant 
to an active democratic citizenry. 
 A second benefit coming from involvement in formal group associations is the 
gaining of experience with compromise and decision-making (Newton 2001; Verba, 
Schlozman and Brady 1995).  Active involvement in an organization has the potential to 
expose members to different types of people with different socio-economic backgrounds, 
ideological positions and learning to accommodate such different types of members 
becomes a useful democratic skill.  Members gain experience listening to alternative 
viewpoints, build consensus, and set group goals.  All of these skills are directly 
relatable to democratic participation.   
 It should be noted, however, that there is likely be a selection bias at work 
between the trusting and active in civic organizations. Studies have show that people 
who join civic organizations tend to be more trusting that those who are not active 
(Stolle 1998; 2001; Uslaner 1999).   This is one of the many reasons the causal direction 
between membership and trust remains unclear.  The murky relationship between the 
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two fundamental underpinnings of social capital theory has led some to question the very 
direction of research on the subject (Jackman and Miller 1998). 
Social engagement in communist and post – communist societies 
While the benefits of social engagement in fostering trust and building social 
capital in advanced western democracies have been thoroughly debated, the legacy of 
social engagement is considerably different in East Central Europe.  The nature of 
associations during the communist period made for an environment where formality was 
viewed with suspicion and informality was the norm.  This skepticism has lingered into 
the post-communist period and leads us to ask just how far the assumptions of the 
Western model extend into this distrustful region. 
An important distinction between totalitarian regimes, such as communist 
regimes, and strictly authoritarian regimes is the crucial role that mass participation 
plays in the survival of totalitarian regimes.  In strictly authoritarian states, mass 
participation is depressed through any means necessary.  Yet in totalitarian regimes, 
regimes whose purpose is not only to maintain control but to also convert the hearts and 
minds of its subjects into loyal followers of the official orthodoxy, mass participation is 
essential to this conversion (Hague and Harrop 2004).  In the case of communist 
systems, the values learned through party membership have not been considered to be 
beneficial to democratic participation nor support for democracy (DiFrancesco and 
Gitelman 1984).  However, research has shown there to be a lack of influence of 
Communist Party membership and democratic values (Gibson, Duch and Tedin 1992) 
and there has been shown to be a positive relationship between prior Communist Party 
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membership and participation in the post-communist era (Letki 2004).  This latter 
finding suggests that the skills learned even in a totalitarian organization can still 
translate into useful skills in a democratic setting. 
Just as interpersonal trust in Post-Communist Europe has been found to be low, 
so too are the levels of associational group membership.  Howard (2003) has argued that 
the low civic associational numbers may be attributed to three primary factors: the 
persistence of mistrust of communist organizations, the ongoing strength of informal 
friendship networks, and widespread disappointment with the post-communist 
transitions. The disappointment many people have felt with the political and economic 
transitions has left them wary of joining associations they see these associations as part 
of the new order and, as such, as ineffective in meeting their needs.  Part of Howard’s 
argument is that more informal modes of interaction between citizens have filled that 
void that the lack of formal organizations has created and this speaks to the importance 
of informal relationship in the communist past. 
A strong example of the importance of interpersonal trust during communist 
period comes from examining the phenomenon of blat in the Soviet Union (Ledeneva 
1998).  Blat is defined by Ledeneva as “the use of personal networks and informal 
contacts to obtain goods and services in short supply and to find a way around formal 
procedures” (Ledeneva 1998).  Ledeneva also comments that blat was “…a reaction of 
ordinary people to the structural constraints of the socialist system of distribution – a 
series of practices which enabled the Soviet system to function and made it tolerable, but 
also subverted it” (Ledeneva 1998).  Blat is a system of continual favor giving that 
 58 
weaves across relationships to overcome the shortages of the economic system.  Because 
this system of transaction took place outside the control of the state authorities, the 
Soviet leadership regarded it as corruption and even denied its existence for many years.  
Because of the technical illegality of blat practices, they represented an extreme trust 
situation because any link in the chain could expose it to the authorities. 
Trusting social networks are not a phenomenon in post-communist countries that 
are confined to the communist past; they continue to exist and remain vital for the 
economic welfare of the poor in particular.  In a study of social networks in the Kyrgyz 
Republic, Kuhenast and Dudwick (2004) find that family networks are essential for poor 
families meeting the expectations demanded of each other in certain social situations, 
such as weddings and birthday parties.  Without the extended family network, the poor 
would be unable to meet the financial demands on their own, thus severely damaging the 
family’s reputation.  This bond within class, the author suggest, is stronger then the 
family bond, as rich family members often eventually turn their backs on the poor 
members out of embarrassment and the awkwardness that now accompanies the later 
constantly asking money from the former.  Thus the rich tend to form their own 
exclusive social networks (Kuehnast and Dudwick 2004).  A study of the Siberian city of 
Novosibirsk presented similar findings as those in Kyrgyzstan (Busse 2001).  Wealthy 
residents of Novosibirsk are able to put less into the local social capital system while 
poor residents are forced to continue contributing to the social capital system and rely on 
it as their only, or most reliable, capital resource. 
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It should be noted also that the importance of social networks is not just the case 
for the poor, but remains true for the middle-classes also.  Ledeneva (1998) points to the 
modern day expression of blat as resulting from citizens attempting to work around the 
constraints of the transitional economy.  Assistance finding jobs, secure business 
financing, obtaining money for everyday expenses, and purchasing for businesses are 
examples of blat in the transitional economy, even if the word itself is largely antiquated.   
There is evidence that the citizens in Russia have developed networks with a 
strong political capacity in response to the totalitarianism of the communist era and that 
citizens involved in such networks are more likely to hold important democratic ideals 
(Gibson 2001).  These networks have become crucial to the dissemination of democratic 
ideals across society.  However, it should also be noted that Gibson’s network approach 
downplays the importance of interpersonal trust in determining attitudes towards 
political processes and democratic institutions.  The benefit of these social networks, 
Gibson would argue, is in the teaching of democratic principles and not as incubators of 
trust. 
 We are left with a mixed picture of communist participation, both formal and 
informal, and the possible benefits to democratic participation and the development of 
trust.  It is reasonable to suggest that the informal nature of associations during the 
communist period could provide seed to more general feelings of trust in the post-
communist era where misgivings over formal associations fail to do so.  It is also 
reasonable to follow the prior research that suggests, totalitarian or not, that skills 
learned through association under the communist system may translate into democratic 
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participation, which could then in turn foster trust as it does in Western democracies.  
We will now turn towards testing this relationship using measures of attitudes about 
social engagement, both formal and informal, on generalized trust. 
Data and methods 
The data in this analysis come from the two rounds of the European Social 
Survey (ESS) conducted in 2002 and 2004.  I will present the results from the four post-
communist countries previously identified in Chapter III, specifically the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. The dependent variable is generalized trust, 
and this will be measured using the 11-point standard generalized trust question 
modified from the one found in the World Values Survey.7  The independent variables 
are a collection of attitudes and dichotomous measures for particular life experiences.  
The method of analysis is Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) with linearized standard 
errors. 
Theory and hypotheses 
 The analysis that follows will test the impact of various measures of social 
engagement on generalized trust.  The concept of social engagement will be measured 
through multiple forms ranging form explicit involvement in political activities to 
attitudes towards life in general to feelings of safety or discrimination in society.  I argue 
that these measures collectively reflect how engaged with society the individual 
respondent is.  I expect to find that given the increased importance of informal 
association to post-communist life, informal forms of engagement that are attributed 
                                                
7 For a more detailed explanation see the discussion in Chapter III. 
 61 
more to personal experience or close interaction will prove to be a stronger factor in trust 
calculations than more structured forms of interaction. 
 The first hypothesis I test supposes that personal interaction has a positive effect 
on trust because having close relationships is an important tool for people to help deal 
with the adversities of their life.  They are a way to release stress, share feelings, and 
generally overcome the uncertainty of life.  An inability to express trust on an intimate 
level would not bode well for the expression of trust on the societal level. 
H1: Frequent or close personal interaction will have a positive effect on 
generalized trust. 
 It is important to note in any study of trust that the effect of psychological 
predisposition should not be ignored.  A person’s general attitude towards life is a 
potentially strong factor in determining a fellow emotional response as generalized trust.  
It has been shown that a person’s general mood affects their interpretation of life as 
much as the actual occurrence of good or bad events (Seidlitz and Diener 1993).  
Therefore, the respondent’s overall level of satisfaction with his/her life will be taken 
into account. 
H2: Higher satisfaction with one’s life will have a positive effect on 
generalized trust. 
 Hypotheses 3 and 4 each address the possible effects that latter life experiences 
have on trust.  Specifically, I will test whether having any personal experience with 
divorce has a negative effect on trust, as it is perfectly reasonable to think that having 
such a directly negative personal experience would hamper one’s views of humanity.  I 
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will also test a second similar measure of direct negative experience with society: 
experience as the victim of a crime, which has been suggested as having a negative 
impact on trust (Ferraro 1995).  To test this latter concept, two questions are asked: 
whether the respondent has recently been the victim of a violent crime and whether the 
respondent feels unsafe when walking alone at night. 
H3: Past experience with divorce will have a negative effect on 
generalized trust. 
H4: Personal experience with crime or feeling unsafe will have a negative 
effect on generalized trust. 
 The next hypothesis examines the link between political activities with feelings 
of generalized trust.  Classic social capital theory would suggest that engaging in various 
forms of political activities, such as signing petitions, attending protests, contacting 
one’s representative, would increase trust as such interaction creates feelings of 
connection and goodwill between the participants.  However, as Howard (2003) notes, 
in the post-communist setting such political involvement is less frequent and may be 
attributed to the negative connotations that political or party involvement had in the 
communist system.  Hypothesis 5 will frame the question in terms of the classic social 
capital view of political activities. 
H5: Frequent political engagement or feelings of attachment with a 
political party will have a positive effect on generalized trust. 
 Hypotheses 6 and 7 will address discrimination within society.  Two questions 
from the ESS will be used to measure discrimination: one that asks if the respondent is a 
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member of a group discriminated against in society, and one that asks if the respondent 
is an ethnic minority.  Earlier research in the United States finds a strongly negative 
impact of being black on trust (Brehm and Rahn 1997).  I would expect the same 
relationship to find the same relationship among the post-communist states, and indeed 
the four countries used in this study are amongst the most homogenous of the post-
communist countries, which should only highlight the negative effect that discrimination 
should have on generalized trust.   
H6: Being a member of a discriminated against group will have a negative 
effect on generalized trust. 
H7: Being a member of an ethnic minority will have a negative effect on 
generalized trust. 
Results 
 The results of the primary engagement model are presented in Table 4.1. 
Hypothesis 1 suggested that frequent or close personal interaction would have a positive 
effect on generalized trust, and we see strong support for the hypothesis.  The two 
measures for personal interaction, frequency of social meeting with friends or colleagues 
and having someone to intimate matters with were both significant with the latter 
yielding a strong effect.  These findings held in the Czech Republic and Hungary but not 
in Poland or Slovenia.  As theorized, in this case close, informal personal association 
does have a positive effect on generalized trust. 
 Hypothesis 2 suggested a positive relationship between life satisfaction and 
generalized trust and we see that this hypothesis is also supported.  Life satisfaction 
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proved to be highly significant and registered one of the stronger effects in the model, 
consistent with the earlier finding of Brehm and Rahn (1997) in the American case.  This 
suggests a personality driven effect on trust as one’s general life outlook corresponds to 
one’s outlook on the trustworthiness of society. 
 
 
 
Table 4.1: Effects of Social Engagement on Generalized Trust 
      
Independent 
Variable 
Joint Czech 
Republic 
Hungary Poland Slovenia 
      
Freq. of Social 
Meetings 
0.05** 
(0.02) 
0.04 
(0.04) 
0.09 
(0.06) 
0.00 
(0.04) 
0.05 
(0.05) 
 
Anyone to 
Discuss Intimate 
Matters With 
 
  0.20* 
(0.11) 
 
 
   0.35** 
(0.17) 
 
0.67* 
(0.36) 
 
  0.28 
  (0.18) 
 
0.12 
(0.28) 
Life  
Satisfaction 
0.16*** 
(0.02) 
0.18*** 
(0.03) 
0.17*** 
(0.04) 
0.11*** 
(0.03) 
0.23*** 
(0.04) 
Ever Divorced - 0.14 
(0.13) 
- 0.34* 
(0.18) 
0.42 
(0.28) 
0.05 
(0.32) 
- 0.09 
(0.31) 
Victim of 
Violent Crime in 
Last 5 Years 
0.02 
(0.08) 
0.06 
(0.14) 
- 0.11 
(0.23) 
- 0.03 
(0.14) 
0.32 
(0.23) 
Feeling of 
Safety Alone 
After Dark 
- 0.32*** 
(0.05) 
- 0.51*** 
(0.09) 
- 0.34** 
(0.14) 
- 0.27*** 
(0.09) 
- 0.09 
(0.14) 
Discriminated 
Group 
Membership 
0.47*** 
(0.15) 
0.75*** 
(0.26) 
- 0.32 
(0.39) 
0.36 
(0.26) 
0.48 
(0.30) 
Political 
Engagement 
      0.13*** 
(0.05) 
0.02 
(0.07) 
0.20 
(0.17) 
     0.27*** 
(0.08) 
0.06 
(0.12) 
Feel Close to 
Political Party 
      0.24*** 
(0.07) 
0.02 
(0.07) 
0.28 
(0.18) 
0.17 
(0.12) 
   0.33** 
(0.16) 
Belong to an 
Ethnic Minority 
0.38* 
(0.20) 
0.05 
(0.35) 
1.60*** 
(0.45) 
0.07 
(0.36) 
0.71* 
(0.42) 
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Table 4.1 continued 
      
Independent 
Variable 
Joint Czech 
Republic 
Hungary Poland Slovenia 
      
Left-Right  
Ideology Scale 
0.03** 
(0.01) 
0.07*** 
(0.03) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
- 0.52 
(0.04) 
Level of 
Household 
Income 
0.04* 
(0.02) 
- 0.04 
(0.04) 
0.04 
(0.09) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.06) 
Satisfaction with 
Household 
Income 
0.12** 
(0.05) 
0.26*** 
(0.09) 
0.08 
(0.15) 
0.07 
(0.10) 
0.08 
(0.13) 
Male - 0.10 
(0.07) 
- 0.28** 
(0.12) 
- 0.02 
(0.17) 
- 0.21* 
(0.12) 
0.50*** 
(0.16) 
Age 0.00 
(0.00) 
- 0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
- 0.01 
(0.01) 
Level of 
Education 
0.21*** 
(0.03) 
0.13 
(0.08) 
0.25*** 
(0.07) 
0.19*** 
(0.04) 
0.21*** 
(0.07) 
Constant 2.63*** 
(0.77) 
2.83** 
(1.29) 
0.77 
(2.20) 
4.88*** 
(1.44) 
0.37 
(1.73) 
      
! 
R
2 0.10 0.13 0.15 0.08 0.12 
N 4,754 1,466 633 1,710 945 
      
10.* !p   05.** !p   01.*** !p  
 
 
  
The hypotheses regarding past life experiences yielded some mixed findings.  
Hypothesis 3 argued for a negative relationship between the traumatic event of divorce 
and generalized trust.  This hypothesis was not supported, as having had a divorce did 
not register a significant impact on trust at all.  We also see mixed evidence for 
Hypothesis 4, which suggested that having been the victim of a crime or feeling unsafe 
would have a negative impact on trust.  Past experience as the victim of a crime failed to 
register a significant effect on trust.  However, feeling unsafe at night when alone 
yielded highly significant and strongly negative effect. 
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 Hypothesis 5 suggested that political engagement or feelings of attachment with 
a political party would have positive effect on trust.  We see that this hypothesis was 
supported as both measures of this hypothesis, the index of political participation and 
feelings of closeness with a political party, had highly significant and notably strong 
positive effects.  This finding is consistent with prior research on social capital but is 
rather surprising given the circumstances of post-communist political life.  The negative 
connotation of political parties may depress levels of political engagement and party 
identification, but it does not appear to hinder generalized trust if that connection does 
exist for an individual.  It should be noted that these effects were seen in the combined 
model across countries, but was not supported on an individual country basis except for 
political engagement in Poland. 
 Hypotheses 6 and 7 each deal with discrimination in society and suggest that 
membership in a group that has been discriminated against and membership in an ethnic 
minority group, respectively, will have negative effects on trust.  I find support for both 
of these hypotheses as both variables had significant and strongly negative effects.  In 
particular, being a member in a group that experiences some discrimination in society 
registered the single strongest effect in the model.  The ethnic minority measure was also 
notably strong in Hungary.  This is interesting as Hungary is the most ethnically diverse 
country examined in this study.  As a former center of the Hapsburg Empire, Hungary 
was left with a sizable number of German, Romanian, Slovak, Roma and other ethnic 
minorities within its borders when the Empire collapsed.  While the borders of Hungary 
contracted considerably, the presence of the minority groups of that period remain today. 
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 The control variables included in the model brought some mixed results.  Age 
failed to be significant indicators of trust, while satisfaction with one’s household 
economic situation and level of education completed were significantly strong predictors 
of trust.  The reader will remember that this latter observation is consistent with the 
earlier findings in Chapter III.  In the general model gender failed to achieve a 
significant result, yet in each individual country model except Hungary the male dummy 
variable yielded a significantly negative impact.  In Slovenia the impact was just the 
opposite, male were considerably more trusting than women.  With these conflicting 
findings, it is impossible to draw any strong conclusions regarding gender and trust. 
Conclusions 
 What conclusions may be drawn from this analysis?  The theory I suggested in 
this chapter pointed to the informal nature of relationships in post-communist states and 
suggested that informal measures of social engagement would prove more illuminating 
than more formal group association.  This suggestion was met with conditional support.  
The first two measures of informal association were the frequency of social meetings 
with close friends or colleagues.  In the overall model, a significantly positive 
relationship was found, yet when the sample was divided into the individual countries 
the effect disappeared.  The second measure of informal association was whether or not 
the respondent had someone they could discuss intimate matters with.  Again, in the 
general model the relationship was positive and significant, but further analysis revealed 
that the effect was present only in the Czech Republic and Hungary.   
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 When it comes to more formal forms of political participation and feelings of 
party attachment, the general model showed strong and positive effects on trust. These 
findings are surprising because of the lingering mistrust of political parties widespread 
across Post-Communist Europe.  While many may feel wary towards parties in the post-
communist environment, those that do attach to parties seem to gain some beneficial 
feelings of trust towards people in general.  However, it is possible that there is a 
selection bias at work as it is plausible that the most politically engaged are so because 
of their feelings of goodwill towards humanity and a desire to make the world a better 
place for good people. 
 The strongest and most consistent predictors of trust were the respondent’s 
overall life satisfaction, their feelings of discrimination and level of education.  Life 
satisfaction was strongly significant and positive across every sub-group in the sample.  
While studies of trust tend to focus on the cultural or political environment, it cannot be 
denied that an individual’s outlook on life is the best indication of their level of 
generalized trust.  To further underscore this point, the most consistently negative effect 
observed in this analysis came from the respondent’s feelings of safety at night.  A 
generally negative or positive predisposition clearly translated into corresponding 
feelings of trust.  Additionally on the negative side, feelings of discrimination were fairly 
consistent in their negative effect on trust as most sub-groups registered a significant 
effect.  Membership in a minority group was not as consistent and the role of ethnicity is 
one area of future study that deserves greater attention in the post-communist states. 
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 In the end we are left with a picture of generalized trust that feels influences both 
from formal association and informal association in a manner consistent with the 
relationships we see in the Western world.  Post-communist states show that just because 
levels of trust and association are low, the fundamental relationship remains the same.  
Informal relationships show a positive, but inconsistent, relationship with trust while 
formal association shows an unexpectedly positive effect.  The normalization of politics 
in post-communist states towards a more familiar Western model is bringing with it 
patterns of behavior and relationships that we have observed in the West for some time.  
This bodes well for the trajectory of these states and should provide encouragement to 
observers of the region.  The next chapter will present the results of combining the 
cleavage attitude model from cleavage attitude model from Chapter III with the social 
engagement model in this chapter.  We will see that many of the same relationships hold 
up. 
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CHAPTER V 
JOINT MODEL OF CLEAVAGE ATTITUDES AND SOCIAL ENGAGEMENT 
 The previous two chapters have presented a pair of models emphasizing different 
influences on trust in Central Eastern Europe.  The first model focused on attitudes 
associated with cleavages that developed out of the transition to democracy and a free-
market economy.  The second model combined familiar notions of formal political 
association from the Western literature on trust with informal measures of personal 
association.  Each model shed light on factors influencing generalized trust, yet without 
combining the models the picture is left incomplete.  This chapter will present the results 
of a joint model of trust combining the factors illustrated in Chapters III and IV. 
 Table 5.1 presents the results of the joint model of trust across the four states 
examined in this study, as well as the results of the model in each country separately.  
The models explained a fair amount of variance in the dataset with r-squared statistics of 
0.16 for all the countries, and of 0.20, 0.24, 0.11 and 0.21 for the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovenia, respectively.  The similarities between the combined 
model and the separate cleavage and engagement models are striking.  Most of the key 
findings across each separate model appear in the combined model as well. 
 All of the significant cleavage attitude variables are significant in this model and 
show the same substantive impact as in Chapter III.  Religiosity again fails to be 
significant.  The individual country differences also mainly hold.  Among the control 
variables, age fails to be significant in the combined model where it was, albeit very 
marginally, in the original cleavage model. 
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Table 5.1: Effects of Combined Cleavage and Engagement Model on Generalized Trust 
      
Independent 
Variable 
Joint Czech 
Republic 
Hungary Poland Slovenia 
      
Left-Right  
Ideology Scale 
      0.05*** 
(0.02) 
0.05 
(0.03) 
      0.14*** 
(0.05) 
   0.05* 
(0.03) 
- 0.01 
  (0.04) 
Homosexuality    - 0.09*** 
(0.03) 
- 0.10* 
(0.06) 
- 0.08 
  (0.08) 
- 0.06 
  (0.05) 
- 0.13 
  (0.08) 
Gov’t Role 
Reducing Income 
Inequality 
 
0.04 
(0.04) 
 
0.09 
(0.06) 
 
  0.22* 
(0.12) 
 
 - 0.12* 
  (0.07) 
 
0.17 
(0.11) 
Religiosity 0.01 
(0.02) 
- 0.02 
  (0.04) 
- 0.01 
  (0.04) 
0.00 
(0.03) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
Authoritarianism       0.06*** 
(0.01) 
 0.03 
(0.02) 
0.00 
(0.03) 
      0.06*** 
(0.02) 
      0.09*** 
(0.03) 
Immigration       0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
      0.07*** 
(0.02) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
  0.05* 
(0.02) 
Political Reform       0.06*** 
(0.01) 
     0.08*** 
(0.01) 
      0.06*** 
(0.01) 
      0.06*** 
(0.01) 
      0.05*** 
(0.01) 
Environment    - 0.18*** 
(0.05) 
- 0.14* 
(0.08) 
0.06 
(0.13) 
    - 0.23*** 
(0.09) 
- 0.10 
  (0.11) 
Freq. of Social 
Meetings 
0.02 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.05) 
0.04 
(0.07) 
- 0.00 
  (0.05) 
0.01 
(0.06) 
Anyone to Discuss 
Intimate Matters 
With 
    0.26** 
(0.12) 
    0.45** 
(0.19) 
- 0.16 
  (0.41) 
0.23 
(0.21) 
- 0.06 
  (0.32) 
Life Satisfaction       0.08*** 
(0.02) 
    0.08** 
(0.04) 
 0.07 
(0.05) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
      0.15*** 
(0.04) 
Ever Divorced  0.05 
(0.14) 
  0.39* 
(0.20) 
- 0.39 
  (0.28) 
- 0.13 
  (0.36) 
0.10 
(0.32) 
Victim of 
Burglary/Assault 
in Last 5 Years 
- 0.05 
  (0.09) 
- 0.09 
  (0.16) 
0.16 
(0.27) 
- 0.05 
  (0.15) 
- 0.35 
  (0.23) 
Feeling of Safety 
Alone After Dark 
     - 0.23*** 
  (0.06) 
  - 0.37*** 
(0.10) 
- 0.15 
  (0.16) 
    - 0.24*** 
(0.09) 
- 0.07 
  (0.14) 
Discriminated 
Group 
Membership 
-0.24 
(0.17) 
- 0.36 
  (0.28) 
0.33 
(0.41) 
- 0.10 
  (0.30) 
- 0.37 
  (0.30) 
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Table 5.1 continued 
      
Independent 
Variable 
Joint Czech 
Republic 
Hungary Poland Slovenia 
      
Political 
Engagement 
  - 0.12** 
(0.05) 
0.02 
(0.08) 
  - 0.42** 
(0.20) 
    - 0.25*** 
(0.09) 
- 0.07 
  (0.13) 
Feel Close to 
Political Party 
0.26*** 
(0.08) 
    0.35** 
(0.14) 
0.30 
(0.20) 
0.06 
(0.13) 
0.26 
(0.17) 
Belong to an 
Ethnic Minority 
- 0.37 
  (0.26) 
- 0.28 
  (0.46) 
    - 1.77*** 
(0.52) 
 0.08 
(0.45) 
- 0.58 
  (0.50) 
Level of 
Household Income 
 0.01 
(0.03) 
  - 0.11** 
(0.05) 
 0.03 
(0.11) 
  0.09* 
(0.05) 
0.01 
(0.07) 
Satisfaction with 
Household Income 
 0.07 
(0.06) 
  0.21* 
(0.11) 
- 0.07 
  (0.17) 
0.05 
(0.11) 
0.08 
(0.13) 
Male - 0.03 
  (0.08) 
- 0.03 
  (0.14) 
- 0.06 
  (0.20) 
- 0.15 
  (0.13) 
  0.32* 
(0.17) 
Age - 0.00 
  (0.00) 
- 0.00 
  (0.01) 
- 0.00 
  (0.01) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
- 0.01 
  (0.01) 
Level of 
Education 
      0.19*** 
(0.03) 
 0.08 
(0.09) 
      0.21*** 
(0.08) 
      0.19*** 
(0.04) 
    0.17** 
(0.07) 
      
Constant     1.66** 
(0.71) 
1.24 
(1.27) 
  4.22* 
(2.34) 
     4.08*** 
(1.21) 
- 0.33 
  (1.55) 
      
! 
R
2 0.16 0.20 0.24 0.11 0.21 
N 3,496 948 457 1,288 803 
      
10.* !p   05.** !p   01.*** !p  
 
 
 There were important differences between the social engagement model and the 
combined model and these give pause to the initial optimism of the model.  Frequency of 
social meetings is significant in all four countries combined, yet not in any of them 
individually nor was it significant in the original engagement-only model.  This does is 
not strong enough evidence to suggest a definitive relationship.  The variables 
addressing minority group membership and discriminated group membership also ceased 
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to be significant in the combined model with the exception of Hungary.  This difference 
will be addressed later in Chapter VI.   
 Yet many relationships did hold up across the joint model and showed a similar 
effect within the individual cases as they did in the engagement-only model.  Formal 
political engagement and feelings of party-closeness displayed the same positive effects, 
life satisfaction was significant in the joint, Czech and Slovene models, and the 
respondent’s level of education continued to be a strong indicator of trust. 
These findings are interesting, but they can be scrutinized further by dividing the 
sample up along the socio-demographic control variables to provide more robust results.  
Tables 5.2 through 5.5 present these results.  With the exception of gender, the samples 
were divided up into thirds indicating the highest, medium and lowest values as 
determined by the distribution within the sample. 
 Table 5.2 presents the results of the analysis with the sample was divided along 
gender lines.  The variance explained by the model was 0.17 for males and 0.16 for 
females.  The results across the four hypotheses remained consistent with the findings of 
the general model.  Many of the cleavage attitude measures behaved consistently across 
gender and measures of authoritarian attitudes were significant and positive.  The effect 
of the government role in reducing income inequality was split, as it did not register a 
significant impact among women, whereas among men the effect was positive and 
significant as expected. The effect of political reform attitudes was consistent among 
both men and women.  Religiosity again failed to prove significant as a predictor of  
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Table 5.2: Effects of Cleavage Attitudes on Generalized Trust by Gender  
   
Independent Variable Males Females 
    
Left-Right  
Ideology Scale 
0.04 
(0.02) 
      0.07*** 
(0.02) 
Homosexuality - 0.09* 
(0.05) 
- 0.09* 
 (0.05) 
Gov’t Role Reducing  
Income Inequality 
   0.12** 
(0.05) 
- 0.04 
  (0.05) 
Religiosity 0.03 
(0.02) 
- 0.00 
   (0.02) 
Authoritarianism     0.04** 
(0.02) 
     0.07*** 
(0.02) 
Immigration    0.02** 
(0.01) 
   0.03** 
(0.01) 
Political Reform       0.07*** 
(0.01) 
     0.06*** 
(0.01) 
Environment   - 0.16** 
(0.07) 
   - 0.18*** 
(0.07) 
Freq. of Social Meetings 0.03 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
Anyone to Discuss  
Intimate Matters With 
0.07 
(0.18) 
      0.44*** 
(0.16) 
Life Satisfaction     0.06** 
(0.03) 
      0.09*** 
(0.03) 
Ever Divorced - 0.25 
  (0.20) 
  0.32* 
(0.19) 
Victim of Burglary/Assault in 
Last 5 Years 
- 0.13 
  (0.13) 
0.04 
(0.13) 
Feeling of Safety  
Alone After Dark 
  - 0.19** 
(0.09) 
   - 0.25*** 
(0.08) 
Discriminated Group 
Membership 
0.03 
(0.22) 
  - 0.51** 
(0.24) 
Political  
Engagement 
- 0.06 
  (0.07) 
  - 0.21** 
(0.08) 
Feel Close to  
Political Party 
  0.19* 
(0.11) 
     0.31*** 
(0.11) 
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Table 5.2 continued 
   
Independent Variable Males Females 
    
Belong to an  
Ethnic Minority 
- 0.50 
  (0.32) 
- 0.24 
  (0.40) 
Household Income 0.02 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
Satisfaction with  
Household Income 
    0.18** 
(0.09) 
- 0.05 
  (0.09) 
Age  0.00 
(0.00) 
- 0.00 
  (0.00) 
Level of Education       0.14*** 
(0.04) 
      0.22*** 
(0.04) 
   
Constant 0.68 
(0.96) 
      2.81*** 
(1.06) 
   
! 
R
2 0.17 0.16 
N 1,715 1,781 
   
10.* !p   05.** !p   01.*** !p  
 
 
 
trust.  With that exception, the other three measures of social liberalism – 
fundamentalism performed in the same manner as they did in the primary model. 
Overall life satisfaction remains a strong and positive factor among both men and 
women in estimating generalized trust, as is feelings of party attachment and levels of 
education. The first noteworthy finding is the strength of having someone to discuss 
intimate matters with among women and the lack of significance for this variable among 
men.  A second finding of note is the disparity in the effect of being a member of a 
group discriminated against in society among women, who themselves qualify as such a 
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group, and the lack of such an effect among men.  One may very well ask if this finding 
means that the member of a group discriminated against question is in some way a proxy 
for gender, but as indicated in Table 5.1, the gender dummy variable failed to yield a 
significant result.  This would suggest, rather, that the effect of being in a discriminated 
group is felt much stronger by women than it is by men but gender alone is not enough 
to bring out this effect.  The last effect worth pointing out from Table 5.2 is that among 
men, satisfaction with household income is a strong predictor of trust and yet among 
women it fails to reach significance.   
 Table 5.3 divides the sample according to satisfaction with household income.  
Here we again find broad support for the political cleavage attitudes hypotheses.  The 
first notable aspect of this division is the findings as they pertain to the cohort expressing 
the highest level of satisfaction.  Fewer variables reached significance in this model than 
in any of the others, yet the ones that did displayed by now familiar impacts.  The level 
of education attained was strongest here among the other two satisfaction cohorts and 
strongest among the highest cohort as well.  The authoritarian index reached significance 
and displayed the same positive effects as in the primary model in the medium and least 
satisfied groupings, while the immigration index did so only among the least satisfied.  
Satisfaction with the political order was significant and positive across groupings as it 
has been throughout the study. 
 We see the normally significant effects from political engagement muted some as 
the effect is limited mainly to those in the medium satisfaction cohort.  We also see the 
effects of total household income limited to those who are least satisfied with that 
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income, yet the effect is positive as one might expect.  The effects of close social 
engagement are also lessened in this model, as the effect of having someone to discuss 
intimate matters with is limited to those in the medium satisfaction grouping.  The earlier 
finding of a positive effect from partisan attachment is also limited to the middle 
satisfaction cohort.  The strongest performers among the prior models generally continue 
to show strong results, namely feelings of safety after dark, life satisfaction, and level of 
education completed.   
 
 
 
Table 5.3: Effects of Cleavage Attitudes on Generalized Trust by Satisfaction with 
Household Economic Situation  
    
Independent Variable Highest 
Satisfaction 
Medium Satisfaction Lowest  
Satisfaction 
     
Left-Right  
Ideology Scale 
0.04 
(0.05) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
      0.08*** 
(0.03) 
Homosexuality - 0.12 
  (0.10) 
    - 0.14*** 
(0.05) 
- 0.03 
  (0.05) 
Gov’t Role Reducing 
Income Inequality 
0.15 
(0.09) 
0.04 
(0.05) 
- 0.02 
  (0.07) 
Religiosity 0.06 
(0.04) 
- 0.01 
  (0.02) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
Authoritarianism 0.02 
(0.03) 
     0.06*** 
(0.02) 
      0.07*** 
(0.02) 
Immigration 0.00 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
      0.05*** 
(0.01) 
Political Reform       0.05*** 
(0.01) 
      0.06*** 
(0.01) 
      0.07*** 
(0.01) 
Environment - 0.02 
  (0.12) 
  - 0.15** 
(0.07) 
    - 0.25*** 
(0.07) 
Freq. of Social 
Meetings 
0.04 
(0.08) 
0.00 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
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Table 5.3 continued 
    
Independent Variable Highest 
Satisfaction 
Medium Satisfaction Lowest  
Satisfaction 
     
Anyone to Discuss  
Intimate Matters With 
0.33 
(0.42) 
    0.43** 
(0.18) 
0.06 
(0.18) 
Life Satisfaction     0.16** 
(0.07) 
      0.08*** 
(0.03) 
0.05 
(0.03) 
Ever Divorced   - 0.94** 
(0.40) 
0.24 
(0.19) 
0.13 
(0.22) 
Victim of 
Burglary/Assault in 
Last 5 Years 
0.02 
(0.26) 
- 0.09 
  (0.13) 
0.02 
(0.16) 
Feeling of Safety  
Alone After Dark 
- 0.27 
   (0.18) 
    - 0.28*** 
(0.08) 
- 0.16* 
(0.09) 
Discriminated Group 
Membership 
0.63 
(0.46) 
- 0.24 
  (0.28) 
- 0.36 
  (0.22) 
Political  
Engagement 
- 0.20 
  (0.13) 
- 0.07 
  (0.07) 
- 0.13 
  (0.09) 
Feel Close to  
Political Party 
0.15 
(0.22) 
      0.42*** 
(0.11) 
0.05 
(0.13) 
Belong to an  
Ethnic Minority 
- 0.19 
  (0.80) 
- 0.35 
  (0.33) 
- 0.39 
  (0.44) 
Household Income - 0.06 
  (0.07) 
- 0.02 
  (0.04) 
  0.10* 
(0.05) 
Male   0.38* 
(0.21) 
- 0.10 
  (0.11) 
- 0.10 
  (0.13) 
Age - 0.00 
   (0.01) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
- 0.01* 
(0.00) 
Level of Education       0.25*** 
(0.08) 
      0.18*** 
(0.04) 
      0.16*** 
(0.05) 
    
Constant 2.31 
(1.92) 
  1.81* 
(0.99) 
1.57 
(1.18) 
    
! 
R
2 0.16 0.13 0.15 
N 500 1,781 1,215 
    
10.* !p   05.** !p   01.*** !p  
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Table 5.4 shows the results of model splitting the sample by level of education 
completed.  The first three cleavage hypotheses were all generally supported again 
among the middle and highest education cohorts.  Among the most educated, prior 
experience with divorce registered a very powerful negative effect, while life satisfaction 
was most positive among this same group.  Political party attachment was also 
powerfully positive among the high education cohort.  Among those with the lowest 
education, the strongest positive indicator was one of the informal association measures, 
having someone to discuss intimate matters with, while political reformist attitudes and 
views towards immigration also registering significantly positive impacts. 
 The most striking result from this model is that the strongly negative effect of 
belonging to an ethnic minority among the least education cohort actually shows a 
positive relationship among the most highly educated cohort while remaining negative 
among the other two groups.  Not only is the effect positive, it is powerfully so.  Even 
more powerful, however, is the negative effect of the same variable for the lowest 
education respondents.  Why the substantial discrepancy between the two?  It may be 
that education gives the respondent enough intellectual tools or greater perspective to 
overcome the feelings of discrimination against them and distrust that goes along those 
feelings. 
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Table 5.4: Effects of Cleavage Attitudes on Generalized Trust by Level of Education 
    
Independent Variable Highest Education Middle  
Education 
Lowest  
Education 
     
Left-Right  
Ideology Scale 
      0.11*** 
(0.04) 
    0.04** 
(0.02) 
0.04 
(0.04) 
Homosexuality - 0.08 
   (0.08) 
    - 0.11*** 
(0.04) 
- 0.03 
  (0.09) 
Gov’t Role Reducing 
Income Inequality 
0.00 
(0.07) 
0.05 
(0.05) 
0.04 
(0.14) 
Religiosity 0.01 
(0.04) 
- 0.00 
  (0.02) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
Authoritarianism       0.10*** 
(0.03) 
      0.05*** 
(0.01) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
Immigration - 0.01 
   (0.02) 
      0.03*** 
(0.01) 
      0.07*** 
(0.03) 
Political Reform       0.04*** 
(0.01) 
      0.07*** 
(0.01) 
      0.05*** 
(0.01) 
Environment - 0.19* 
 (0.11) 
    - 0.18*** 
(0.06) 
- 0.09 
  (0.14) 
Freq. of Social 
Meetings 
- 0.00 
   (0.07) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
- 0.00 
   (0.06) 
Anyone to Discuss  
Intimate Matters With 
0.13 
(0.37) 
  0.25* 
(0.14) 
  0.49* 
(0.29) 
Life Satisfaction       0.18*** 
(0.05) 
    0.05** 
(0.02) 
0.06 
(0.05) 
Ever Divorced  - 0.55** 
(0.28) 
0.12 
(0.17) 
0.57 
(0.51) 
Victim of 
Burglary/Assault in 
Last 5 Years 
- 0.15 
   (0.19) 
0.06 
(0.11) 
- 0.40 
  (0.33) 
Feeling of Safety  
Alone After Dark 
    - 0.49*** 
(0.14) 
    - 0.22*** 
(0.07) 
- 0.03 
  (0.15) 
Discriminated Group 
Membership 
- 0.32 
   (0.40) 
- 0.26 
  (0.21) 
0.05 
(0.38) 
Political  
Engagement 
- 0.07 
   (0.10) 
  - 0.16** 
(0.06) 
- 0.03 
   (0.21) 
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Table 5.4 continued 
    
Independent Variable Highest Education Middle  
Education 
Lowest  
Education 
     
Feel Close to  
Political Party 
      0.49*** 
(0.17) 
    0.23** 
(0.10) 
0.17 
(0.20) 
Belong to an  
Ethnic Minority 
    1.07** 
(0.48) 
- 0.41 
  (0.31) 
    - 1.85*** 
(0.48) 
Household Income 0.03 
(0.06) 
0.00 
(0.04) 
0.08 
(0.08) 
Satisfaction with 
Household Income 
- 0.07 
   (0.14) 
0.11 
(0.07) 
0.01 
(0.14) 
Male - 0.17 
   (0.18) 
- 0.04 
  (0.09) 
0.21 
(0.20) 
Age 0.00 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
- 0.01 
  (0.01) 
    
Constant     3.02** 
(1.52) 
      2.51*** 
(0.87) 
- 0.91 
  (2.19) 
    
! 
R
2 669 0.15 0.15 
N 0.16 2,339 499 
    
10.* !p   05.** !p   01.*** !p  
 
 
 
Finally, Table 5.5 shows the results of the model divided according to age.  The 
division for the age groups according to the sample ended up being below 36 as the 
lowest third, 37 to 55 as the middle third, and over 56 as the highest third.  The results of 
the political cleavage attitude hypotheses tended to be supported along this division as 
well, with some interesting differences surfacing among individual measures. 
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The oldest age cohort contained a few surprises.  First among them was the 
relatively weak support for the hypothesis regarding authoritarian attitudes.  The 
authoritarianism index of attitudes failed to reach significance at all, and the government 
role reducing income inequality measure achieved significance at the lowest level, yet 
yielded a strong, positive effect on trust.  Another interesting result was the strength of 
attitudes towards homosexual freedoms on trust among the oldest age group.  This effect 
was highly significant and negative, as theorized, yet the strength of the effect in relation 
to the other two age cohorts was notable.  Amongst the elderly, this clearly is a strong 
indicator of social fundamentalist attitudes and depresses trust. 
 We again see consistent evidence across the middle and highest age cohorts for 
the positive effects of life satisfaction and education, as well as the consistently negative 
effects of feeling unsafe alone after dark.  The discrimination variables showed some 
interesting effects across cohorts.  Among the oldest cohort, membership in a 
discriminated group was an extremely negative factor, and insignificant among the other 
two groups, while among the youngest cohort being an ethnic minority was equally as 
strong, and also insignificant among the other two cohorts.  
 Perhaps the most interesting finding from Table 5.5 is the significant and 
strongly positive effect of political engagement among the youngest cohort and its 
insignificant effect among the elder two cohorts.  This can be interpreted as a comment 
on the attitude towards politics among the young compared to the older generations.  It 
may also very well be that the younger cohort takes more of the benefits from political 
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group association than the older cohorts do as they are more set in their views and 
relationships than are the young. 
 
 
 
Table 5.5: Effects of Cleavage Attitudes on Generalized Trust by Age 
    
Independent Variable Top 3rd  
(over 56) 
Middle 3rd 
(37-55) 
Bottom 3rd 
(below 36) 
     
Left-Right  
Ideology Scale 
      0.09*** 
(0.03) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
 0.01 
(0.03) 
Homosexuality  - 0.13** 
(0.06) 
- 0.06 
  (0.05) 
- 0.03 
  (0.07) 
Gov’t Role Reducing 
Income Inequality 
0.10 
(0.07) 
- 0.00 
  (0.06) 
0.04 
(0.07) 
Religiosity - 0.02 
   (0.03) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
Authoritarianism 0.02 
(0.02) 
      0.08*** 
(0.02) 
      0.07*** 
(0.02) 
Immigration 0.01 
(0.01) 
      0.04*** 
(0.01) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
Political Reform      0.06*** 
(0.01) 
      0.06*** 
(0.01) 
      0.07*** 
(0.01) 
Environment - 0.10 
  (0.08) 
    - 0.23*** 
(0.07) 
- 0.13 
  (0.09) 
Freq. of Social 
Meetings 
0.02 
(0.04) 
0.04 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.05) 
Anyone to Discuss  
Intimate Matters With 
 0.31* 
(0.17) 
0.29 
(0.20) 
- 0.23 
  (0.34) 
Life Satisfaction    0.08** 
(0.03) 
      0.09*** 
(0.03) 
0.06 
(0.04) 
Ever Divorced 0.06 
(0.22) 
- 0.16 
  (0.21) 
    0.59** 
(0.30) 
Victim of 
Burglary/Assault in 
Last 5 Years 
- 0.22 
  (0.19) 
0.09 
(0.15) 
- 0.05 
  (0.16) 
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Table 5.5 continued 
    
Independent Variable Top 3rd  
(over 56) 
Middle 3rd 
(37-55) 
Bottom 3rd 
(below 36) 
     
Feeling of Safety  
Alone After Dark 
  - 0.21** 
(0.10) 
- 0.16* 
(0.09) 
    - 0.32*** 
(0.11) 
Discriminated Group 
Membership 
  - 0.59** 
(0.27) 
- 0.02 
  (0.24) 
-0.15 
  (0.37) 
Political  
Engagement 
- 0.05 
   (0.10) 
- 0.10 
  (0.08) 
  - 0.21** 
(0.10) 
Feel Close to  
Political Party 
0.20 
(0.14) 
0.19 
(0.12) 
      0.44*** 
(0.15) 
Belong to an  
Ethnic Minority 
- 0.07 
   (0.44) 
- 0.04 
  (0.41) 
  - 1.00** 
(0.43) 
Household Income 0.05 
(0.05) 
- 0.03 
  (0.05) 
0.02 
(0.05) 
Satisfaction with 
Household Income 
0.11 
(0.10) 
 0.05 
(0.10) 
0.05 
(0.11) 
Male 0.15 
(0.13) 
- 0.12 
  (0.12) 
- 0.12 
  (0.15) 
Level of Education       0.19*** 
(0.05) 
      0.22*** 
(0.05) 
0.14 
(0.06) 
    
Constant 1.55 
(1.27) 
0.59 
(1.00) 
    2.89** 
(1.38) 
    
! 
R
2 0.15 0.16 0.19 
N 1,193 1,427 891 
    
10.* !p   05.** !p   01.*** !p  
 
 
When joining the cleavage attitude and social engagement models together the 
fundamental findings remain largely unchanged.  Authoritarian attitudes and socially 
fundamentalist attitudes continue to show a negative relationship with trust.  Informal 
association shows a weak, if non-existent, relationship.  Formal associations continue to 
display a positive relationship with trust despite the communist past.  What also remains 
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unchanged is that these individual effects varied greatly across the four countries under 
study.  More so, when the models were joined and further divided by socio-demographic 
control variables, the relationships vary greatly.  Overall, the fundamental hypotheses 
are supported using either technique and this provides promising evidence towards the 
importance of these cleavage attitudes and modes of social engagement. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
Cleavages, social engagement and trust 
 This dissertation argued that trust is affected by attitudes reflected in political 
cleavages born out of the transition to democracy and by the informal nature of social 
interaction in post-communist states.  How did these arguments fair under empirical 
examination? 
Chapter III examined the effects that attitudes associated with political cleavages 
that have developed from the democratization process.  Three cleavages in particular 
were highlighted that have come out of the transition to democracy and proven to be 
among the defining divisions in post-communist societies: the cleavage between 
authoritarian – libertarian attitudes towards government and authority, the cleavage 
between socially fundamentalist – liberal attitudes, and the cleavage between those 
supportive of the democratic/free market reforms and those who are not satisfied with 
the reforms.  These divisions have been salient enough for political parties to have 
effectively been able to mobilize the public and the cleavages have helped form the 
boundaries of political discourse. 
 In general, the hypotheses put forth in Chapter III were supported by the 
cleavage attitude model, as respondents with libertarian attitudes, socially liberal 
attitudes and support for the state of the political order as a result of the reforms 
undertaken expressed greater generalized trust.  The only cleavage that failed to show 
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any relationship whatsoever was the religion cleavage, as the index of religiosity failed 
to be significant in any of the countries studied. 
The social engagement model of Chapter IV found partial support for its testing 
hypotheses.  Mixed support for informal association was found, while much more 
consistent support was found for more formal forms of political engagement.  Also 
mixed were the hypotheses regarding various personal attributes and life experiences.  
Life satisfaction consistently affected generalized trust in a positive manner, while 
feelings of safety had a negative impact.  These findings largely comport with prior 
research in advanced industrial countries and do not fully support the notion that the 
informal association of the communist era affects trust more so than the normal benefits 
of formal group association. 
 However, the consideration that each model represents separate portions of the 
overall picture should temper the findings of Chapters III and IV.  Chapter V presented 
the whole picture by combining the cleavage attitude and social engagement models into 
one model of trust.  This larger picture supported many, but not all, of the relationships 
suggested by Chapters III and IV.  
Country effects 
This study began noting two important historical observations that I feel affects 
politics in Central and Eastern Europe in important ways: the legacy of Empire-Colony 
relations between the region and Western Europe, and the importance of informal 
personal interaction as a means of managing the difficulties of communist life.  With 
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these observations in mind, what patterns were observable through the course of this 
study? 
The Czech Republic did not see consistent results from the cleavage attitudes 
models with the exception of the support for political reforms variable.  The Czechs 
were at the forefront of both political and economic reforms, and the results have been 
among the most successful among post-communist states.  This success has appeared to 
register with the public and the positive effects on trust were in line with the other three 
states in both magnitude and significance.  The impact of economics showed another 
stark impact among the Czechs, in particular satisfaction with one’s household economic 
situation.  In the joint model of cleavage attitudes and social engagement, the Czech 
Republic was the only state to show a significant effect from this variable, an effect 
consistent with each of the separate models run. 
On the social engagement variables, the Czech Republic displayed a unique 
effect where having anyone to discuss intimate matters with was concerned.  It was the 
only country in the combined model to show a very strong positive effect.  This finding 
is not entirely surprising given the Czech history of active social relationships both from 
the casual Bohemian era of leisure or from the more direct and turbulent activism of the 
communist Czechoslovak era.  We also saw in the Czech case as particularly strong 
effect from feelings of party attachment, also unique among the cases.  The Czech 
Republic has seen much greater stability among the political parties comprising the party 
system than Hungary or Poland have seen and so it is perhaps reasonable to expect 
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personal attachment to be greater when the players have remained a familiar and steady 
presence in politics. 
Hungary had the unique position of being on both sides of the Empire-Colony 
relationship as both partner to the Austrians in the Hapsburg Empire, and subjects to the 
Soviets during the communist era.  The experience as colonizer set Hungary apart in 
regards to one interesting variable in this study: belonging to an ethnic minority.  It is not 
uncommon for the cultural hubs of an empire to have a greater level of ethnic diversity 
than the subject areas, and Hungary was no exception.  Where effects of membership in 
an ethnic minority group failed to reach significance in any of the other more 
homogenous societies in the study, the effects in Hungary were the single strongest of 
any variables anwhere in the study. 
Hungary also displayed particularly strong effects for a number of the political 
variables.  Overall political engagement had a strong effect in the combined model in 
Hungary comparable to, but stronger than, only Poland.  Support for the political 
reforms of the transition also positively affected trust in a manner consistent with the 
other states in the study.  Hungary recently experienced a great deal of popular unrest 
directed towards the government for their handling of the economy, if this were as study 
of trust in government rather than interpersonal trust the results for this variable would 
have been much different, but as it were support for the general political order did have a 
positive effect on generalized trust. 
Poland proved to be a more difficult case in this study than the other countries.  
The models tested consistently fit Poland the poorest of the four states, yet the effects we 
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saw were consistent with the other three as well.  Of the four cases in the study, Poland 
had the lowest levels of trust.  Poland also had the hardest time, historically, of the cases 
as the three-way partition of the 18th and 19th centuries left the Polish stateless.  Poland 
also had, arguably, the most antagonistic relationship with the Soviets of all the satellite 
states.  However, the transition reforms in Poland have been quite successful, and the 
support for political reforms variable continued to display the same effect in Poland as in 
the other states.  Despite the economic successes, the satisfaction with household 
economics did not affect Polish respondents the same way as in the other states.  To this 
effect, however, the objective level of household wealth did positively affect trust in 
Poland and not in the other states.  Perhaps to the stoic Polish respondent, reality is more 
important than perception when money is concerned.   
Political engagement yielded a significant positive effect in Poland and this result 
is in line with the history of engagement in the country.  Poland is credited as being the 
state that pushed the first domino of collapse for the communist system and they were 
able to do this through widespread, underground political engagement.  The benefits of 
more formal group associations were evident in Poland, and the legacy of Solidarity can 
be seen in this finding. 
Finally, the most quietly successful state in the post-communist transition: 
Slovenia.  Slovenia enjoyed the greatest economic successes within the former 
Yugoslavia and experienced the shortest, least traumatic war for independence from 
Yugoslavia of the period.  The relative ease of the transition in Slovenia translated into 
the highest relationship between life satisfaction and trust.  This relationship was also 
 91 
seen in the Czech Republic yet was twice as strong in Slovenia.  However, that was one 
of the only variables in the combined model to prove significant in Slovenia, with the 
others being the familiar political reform and level of education variables, and the 
authoritarianism index.   
Future research and addition to the literature on trust 
 This dissertation makes a number of additions to the literature on trust.  The first 
of which is its emphasis on aspects of post-communist life rather than focusing solely on 
communist era explanations.  The focus has been on cleavage attitudes that developed 
out of the transition away from Communism and not on the communist period itself.  
The focus of social engagement model has been on explanations that did draw from the 
communist period, but also drew on the pre-communist period.   
Secondly, the study is the first to link specific post-communist cleavage attitudes 
to generalized trust.  Establishing a baseline of attitudes that is associated with trust in 
post-communist states is important when considering the future outlook for developing 
healthy levels of trust for the strengthening of democracy both in this region and other 
democratizing parts of the world.  We as researchers may evaluate the success, and 
necessity, of developing trust as a component of social capital more accurately if we 
have an idea of what kind of people in society are trusting in the first place.  An excess 
or lack of such supporting attitudes would set the realistic boundaries of trust for that 
society.   
Finally, this study tests prior findings regarding political engagement and trust 
but does so in the unique environment of Post-Communist Europe.  The fact that the 
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general relationship between formal political participation showed to have the same 
beneficial relationship in Eastern Europe as in advanced industrialized countries in an 
interesting finding given the negative connotations formal political engagement has held 
over from the communist era.   
Three avenues of future research are suggested by the findings of this 
dissertation.  The first involves the effects of ethnicity on generalized trust.  The 
Hungary finding in particular leads one to question the impact that minority status may 
have on trust, both internal to the minority group and external to the majority population.  
The trust question of the European Social Survey does not separate the two, nor does it 
ask specific questions of in-group/out-group trust.  The level of ethnic density in the 
state may play an important role in this regard, as recent work by Hero (2007) has 
suggested that societies with greater density of ethnicity develops higher levels of social 
capital than those with lower levels. As ethnicity itself remains an important cleavage in 
post-communist states, transportation of this notion to the post-communist world, and in 
particular to states beyond this study, may yield interesting insights into the question of 
ethnic identity and trust.  
A second separation may be made when considering trust in post-communist 
states, and that is the separation between strategic, specific trust and generalized trust.  
Where this dissertation has focused on generalized trust, it is without question that trust 
operates distinctly on both levels in post-communist society.  Natives of the region are at 
once regarded as consistently distrustful of strangers and loyal, dependable friends.  The 
distinction between these two levels of trust is again not possible through the current 
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ESS trust question, yet research aimed at examining the implications for these two 
separate notions of trust on social capital development would be helpful to the overall 
body of social capital literature.  Particularly regarding the debate over the necessity of 
social capital development to democratizing countries; does which level of trust we 
focus on developing matter to its importance on fostering democracy? 
Finally, the importance of a number of the political cleavage measures begs a 
further dissection of their importance.  Does the relative strength of the cleavage in 
society affect the attitudes effect on trust?  The research of Bartolini and Mair (1990) 
would suggest that it does, however this was not tested in this dissertation. The strength 
of the cleavage, the heterogeneity of society, and the electoral fortunes of parties 
representing these cleavages may bear some effect on trust.  Does the respondent 
represent, in the crudest terms, a “winner” or a ‘loser” in the attitudinal sense?  This 
study focused on the attitude itself and not on potential variations in the relevance of the 
cleavage to the individual countries.  A second, state level measurement of cleavages 
may significantly affect the results of this study. 
These suggestions for future research are just a few of those scholars may choose 
to take to advance the study of trust in post-communist states.  The debates on just what 
constitutes trust and whether as a component of social capital it truly is vital to the 
survival of democracy will continue in the future.  This dissertation has aimed to add a 
little to the knowledge that we have on trust in post-communist states by identifying 
attitudes associated with trust that are relevant to contemporary divisions in post-
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communist society.  It is the hope of this author that scholars will find those attitudes 
helpful and will incorporate those attitudes into future models of trust. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
TRUST QUESTIONS 
 
1. Variable name and label: PPLTRST. Most people can be trusted or you can't be too 
careful? 
 
Using this card, generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or 
that you can't be too careful in dealing with people? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, 
where 0 means you can't be too careful and 10 means that most people can be trusted.  
 
Values and categories 
00 You can't be too careful  
01 1  
02 2  
03 3  
04 4  
05 5  
06 6  
07 7  
08 8  
09 9  
10 Most people can be trusted  
 
LEFT – RIGHT IDEOLOGY SCALE 
 
2. Variable name and label: LRSCALE. Placement on left right scale. 
 
In politics people sometimes talk of "left" and "right". Using this card, where would you 
place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right? 
  
Values and categories 
00 Left  
01 1  
02 2  
03 3  
04 4  
05 5  
06 6  
07 7  
08 8  
09 9  
10 Right  
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POLITICIAL REFORM QUESTIONS 
 
3. Variable name and label: STFECO.  How satisfied with present state of economy in 
country? 
 
On the whole how satisfied are you with the present state of the economy in [country]? 
  
Values and categories 
00 Extremely dissatisfied  
01 1  
02 2  
03 3  
04 4  
05 5  
06 6  
07 7  
08 8  
09 9  
10 Extremely satisfied  
 
4. Variable name and label: STFGOV. How satisfied with the national government. 
 
Now thinking about the [country] government , how satisfied are you with the way it is 
doing its job? 
  
Values and categories 
00 Extremely dissatisfied  
01 1  
02 2  
03 3  
04 4  
05 5  
06 6  
07 7  
08 8  
09 9  
10 Extremely satisfied  
 
Comment: Ireland: Data from Ireland have been omitted from the international data file, 
but is kept in a separate country specific file for Ireland. For further details please see 
item 46 in the Documentation Report.  ESS 2002. 
 
5. Variable name and label: STFDEM.  How satisfied with the way democracy works in 
country. 
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And on the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in [country]? 
 
Values and categories 
00 Extremely dissatisfied  
01 1  
02 2  
03 3  
04 4  
05 5  
06 6  
07 7  
08 8  
09 9  
10 Extremely satisfied  
 
6. Variable name and label: STFEDU. State of education in country nowadays. 
 
Now, using this card, please say what you think overall about the state of education in 
[country] nowadays? 
 
Values and categories 
00 Extremely bad  
01 1  
02 2  
03 3  
04 4  
05 5  
06 6  
07 7  
08 8  
09 9  
10 Extremely good  
 
7. Variable name and label: STFHLTH. State of health services in country nowadays. 
 
Still using this card, please say what you think overall about the state of health services 
in [country] nowadays? 
 
Values and categories 
00 Extremely bad  
01 1  
02 2  
03 3  
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04 4  
05 5  
06 6  
07 7  
08 8  
09 9  
10 Extremely good  
 
AUTHORITARIAN QUESTIONS 
 
Using this card, please say to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the 
following statements 
 
8. Variable name and label: GINCDIF. Government should reduce differences in income 
levels. 
 
The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels. 
  
Values and categories 
1 Agree strongly  
2 Agree  
3 Neither agree nor disagree  
4 Disagree  
5 Disagree strongly  
 
9. Variable name and label: IPSTRGV. Important that government is strong and ensures 
safety. 
 
Now I will briefly describe some people. Please listen to each description and tell me 
how much each person is or is not like you. Use this card for your answer. 
 
Question : It is important to her/him that the government ensures her/his safety against 
all threats. She/he wants the state to be strong so it can defend its citizens. 
  
Values and categories 
1 Very much like me  
2 Like me  
3 Somewhat like me  
4 A little like me  
5 Not like me  
6 Not like me at all  
 
10. Variable name and label: IPBHPRP. Important to behave properly. 
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Now I will briefly describe some people. Please listen to each description and tell me 
how much each person is or is not like you. Use this card for your answer. 
 
Question : It is important to her/him always to behave properly. She/he wants to avoid 
doing anything people would say is wrong. 
  
Values and categories 
1 Very much like me  
2 Like me  
3 Somewhat like me  
4 A little like me  
5 Not like me  
6 Not like me at all  
 
11. Variable name and label: IMPTRAD. Important to follow traditions and customs. 
 
Now I will briefly describe some people. Please listen to each description and tell me 
how much each person is or is not like you. Use this card for your answer. 
 
Question : Tradition is important to her/him. She/he tries to follow the customs handed 
down by her/his religion or her/his family. 
  
Values and categories 
1 Very much like me  
2 Like me  
3 Somewhat like me  
4 A little like me  
5 Not like me  
6 Not like me at all  
 
12. Variable name and label: IPFRULE. Important to do what is told and follow rules. 
 
Now I will briefly describe some people. Please listen to each description and tell me 
how much each person is or is not like you. Use this card for your answer. 
 
Question : She/he believes that people should do what they're told. She/he thinks people 
should follow rules at all times, even when no-one is watching. 
  
Values and categories 
1 Very much like me  
2 Like me  
3 Somewhat like me  
4 A little like me  
5 Not like me  
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6 Not like me at all  
 
13. Variable name and label: IMPFREE. Important to make own decisions and be free. 
 
Now I will briefly describe some people. Please listen to each description and tell me 
how much each person is or is not like you. Use this card for your answer. 
 
Question : It is important to her/him to make her/his own decisions about what she/he 
does. She/he likes to be free and not depend on others. 
  
Values and categories 
1 Very much like me  
2 Like me  
3 Somewhat like me  
4 A little like me  
5 Not like me  
6 Not like me at all  
 
 
14. Variable name and label: IMPENV. Important to care for nature and environment. 
 
Now I will briefly describe some people. Please listen to each description and tell me 
how much each person is or is not like you. Use this card for your answer. 
 
Question : She/he strongly believes that people should care for nature. Looking after the 
environment is important to her/him. 
 
Values and categories 
1 Very much like me  
2 Like me  
3 Somewhat like me  
4 A little like me  
5 Not like me  
6 Not like me at all  
 
LIBERAL – FUNDAMENTALIST QUESTIONS 
 
15. Variable name and label: FREEHMS Gays and lesbians free to live life as they wish 
 
Question : Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish 
  
Values and categories 
1 Agree strongly  
2 Agree  
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3 Neither agree nor disagree  
4 Disagree  
5 Disagree strongly  
 
16. Variable name and label: IMBGECO. Immigration bad or good for country's 
economy. 
 
Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]'s economy that people come to 
live here from other countries? 
  
Values and categories 
00 Bad for the economy  
01 1  
02 2  
03 3  
04 4  
05 5  
06 6  
07 7  
08 8  
09 9  
10 Good for the economy  
 
17. Variable name and label: IMUECLT. Country's cultural life undermined or enriched 
by immigrants. 
 
And, using this card, would you say that [country]'s cultural life is generally undermined 
or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries? 
  
Values and categories 
00 Cultural life undermined  
01 1  
02 2  
03 3  
04 4  
05 5  
06 6  
07 7  
08 8  
09 9  
10 Cultural life enriched  
 
RELIGIOSITY 
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18. Variable name and label: RLGDGR. How religious are you. 
 
Regardless of whether you belong to a particular religion, how religious would you say 
you are? 
  
Values and categories 
00 Not at all religious  
01 1  
02 2  
03 3  
04 4  
05 5  
06 6  
07 7  
08 8  
09 9  
10 Very religious  
 
19. Variable name and label: RLGATND. How often attend religious services apart from 
special occasions. 
 
Apart from special occasions such as weddings and funerals, about how often do you 
attend religious services nowadays? 
  
Values and categories 
01 Never 
02 Less often 
03 Only on special holy days 
04 At least once a month  
05 Once a week 
06 More than once a week 
07 Every day 
 
20. Variable name and label: PRAY. How often pray apart from at religious services. 
 
Apart from when you are at religious services, how often, if at all, do you pray? 
  
Values and categories 
01 Never 
02 Less often 
03 Only on special holy days 
04 At least once a month  
05 Once a week 
06 More than once a week 
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07 Every day 
 
21. Variable name and label: IMPENV. Important to care for nature and environment. 
 
Now I will briefly describe some people. Please listen to each description and tell me 
how much each person is or is not like you. Use this card for your answer. 
 
Question : She/he strongly believes that people should care for nature. Looking after the 
environment is important to her/him. 
 
Values and categories 
1 Very much like me  
2 Like me  
3 Somewhat like me  
4 A little like me  
5 Not like me  
6 Not like me at all  
 
SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC CONTROLS 
 
22. Variable name and label: YRBRN. Year of birth. 
 
And in what year were you born? 
 
23. Variable name and label: INWYR. Year of interview. 
 
Year of interview 
 
***AGE variable calculated by subtracting YRBRN from INWYR. 
 
24. Variable name and label: EDULVL. Highest level of education. 
 
What is the highest level of education you have achieved?  
 
Values and categories 
0 Not completed primary education  
1 Primary or first stage of basic  
2 Lower secondary or second stage of basic  
3 Upper secondary  
4 Post secondary, non-tertiary  
5 First stage of tertiary  
6 Second stage of tertiary  
 
Comment: [Country-specific question and codes for coding into ESS coding frame, 
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based on ISCED-1997] Deviations: Data from Austria have been omitted from the 
international file. For further details, please see item 46 in the Country Reports in the 
Documentation Report. 
 
25. Variable name and label: EDUYRS. Years of full-time education completed. 
 
How many years of full-time education have you completed? 
 
HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
 
Two measures of household income were used: and objective measure in local currency 
(HINCTNT) and a subjective measure of satisfaction with household income. 
 
26. Variable name and label: HINCTNT. Household's total net income, all sources. 
 
Using this card, if you add up the income from all sources, which letter describes your 
household's total net income? If you don't know the exact figure, please give an estimate. 
Use the part of the card that you know best: weekly, monthly or annual income.  
  
Values and categories 
01 J  
02 R  
03 C  
04 M  
05 F  
06 S  
07 K  
08 P  
09 D  
10 H  
11 U  
12 N  
 
Comment: The value labels J-N represent the intervals in € (Euros) as documented in 
Source showcards, page 59, see ESS Round 1 - "Fieldwork documents" at 
http://ess.nsd.uib.no/. Where necessary, corresponding amounts in national currencies 
were inserted, rounding up or down as appropriate. 
 
27. Variable name and label: HINCFEL. Feeling about household's income nowadays. 
 
Which of the descriptions on this card comes closest to how you feel about your 
household's income nowadays? 
  
Values and categories 
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1 Very difficult on present income 
2 Difficult on present income 
3 Coping on present income 
4 Living comfortably on present income 
 
GENDER 
 
28. Variable name and label: GNDR. Gender. 
 
Values and categories 
1 Male  
0 Female  
 
SOCIAL ENGAGEMENT QUESTIONS 
 
INFORMAL SOCIAL ENGAGEMENT QUESTIONS 
 
29. Variable name and label: SCLMEET How often socially meet with friends, relatives 
or colleagues 
 
Using this card, how often do you meet socially with friends, relatives or work 
colleagues? 
 
Values and categories 
01 Never  
02 Less than once a month  
03 Once a month  
04 Several times a month  
05 Once a week  
06 Several times a week  
07 Every day  
 
30. Variable name and label: INMDISC Anyone to discuss intimate and personal matters 
with 
 
Do you have anyone with whom you can discuss intimate and personal matters? 
 
Values and categories 
1 Yes  
0 No  
 
SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING 
 
31. Variable name and label: STFLIFE How satisfied with life as a whole 
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All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole nowadays? Please 
answer using this card, where 0 means extremely dissatisfied and 10 means extremely 
satisfied. 
 
Values and categories 
00 Extremely dissatisfied  
01 1  
02 2  
03 3  
04 4  
05 5  
06 6  
07 7  
08 8  
09 9  
10 Extremely satisfied  
 
CRIME/SAFETY 
 
32. Variable name and label: CRMVCT Respondent or household member victim of 
burglary/assault last 5 years. 
 
Have you or a member of your household been the victim of a burglary or assault in the 
last 5 years? 
 
Values and categories 
1 Yes  
0 No 
 
33. Variable name and label: AESFDRK Feeling of safety of walking alone in local area 
after dark. 
 
How safe do you - or would you - feel walking alone in this area after dark? Do - or 
would - you feel... 
 
Values and categories 
1 Very safe  
2 Safe  
3 Unsafe  
4 Very unsafe 
 
PERSONAL EXPERIENCE WITH DIVORCE 
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34. Variable name and label: DVRCDEV Ever been divorced. 
 
Have you ever been divorced? 
 
Values and categories 
1 Yes  
2 No 
 
FEELINGS OF DISCRIMINATION/MINORITY STATUS 
 
35. Variable name and label: DSCRGRP Member of a group discriminated against in 
this country. 
 
Would you describe yourself as being a member of a group that is discriminated against 
in this country? 
 
Values and categories 
1 Yes  
0 No 
 
36. Variable name and label: BLGETMG Belong to minority ethnic group in country. 
 
Do you belong to a minority ethnic group in [country]? 
 
Values and categories 
1 Yes  
2 No 
 
POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT QUESTIONS 
Variable POLENGAGE is an additive index of forms of organized political 
participation. 
 
37. Variable name and label: CONTPLT Contacted politician or government official last 
12 months. 
 
There are different ways of trying to improve things in [country] or help prevent things 
from going wrong. During the last 12 months, have you done any of the following? Have 
you …  
 
Question : …contacted a politician, government or local government official? 
 
Values and categories 
1 Yes  
0 No  
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38. Variable name and label: WRKPRTY Worked in political party or action group last 
12 months. 
 
There are different ways of trying to improve things in [country] or help prevent things 
from going wrong. During the last 12 months, have you done any of the following? Have 
you …  
 
Question : …worked in a political party or action group? 
 
Values and categories 
1 Yes  
0 No 
 
39. Variable name and label: WRKORG Worked in another organization or association 
last 12 months. 
 
There are different ways of trying to improve things in [country] or help prevent things 
from going wrong. During the last 12 months, have you done any of the following? Have 
you …  
 
Question : …worked in another organization or association? 
 
Values and categories 
1 Yes  
0 No 
 
40. Variable name and label: SGNPTIT Signed petition last 12 months. 
 
There are different ways of trying to improve things in [country] or help prevent things 
from going wrong. During the last 12 months, have you done any of the following? Have 
you …  
 
Question : …signed a petition? 
 
Values and categories 
1 Yes  
0 No 
 
41. Variable name and label: PBLDMN Taken part in lawful public demonstration last 
12 months. 
 
There are different ways of trying to improve things in [country] or help prevent things 
from going wrong. During the last 12 months, have you done any of the following? Have 
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you …  
 
Question : …taken part in a lawful public demonstration? 
 
Values and categories 
1 Yes  
0 No 
 
PARTISANSHIP 
 
42. Variable name and label: CLSPRTY Feel closer to a particular party than all other 
parties. 
 
Is there a particular political party you feel closer to than all the other parties? 
 
Values and categories 
1 Yes  
0 No 
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